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ABSTRACT
This Article examines whether sexual orientation discrimination
claims are a form of sex-plus discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of “sex.” Until very recently, every United
States Court of Appeals to have interpreted Title VII’s prohibition
of sex discrimination had determined that it does not encompass
claims on the basis of sexual orientation. Times, and judicial
interpretations, are changing. In April 2017, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned decades of
precedent by holding that sexual orientation discrimination claims
are indeed encompassed within Title VII’s prohibition of sex
discrimination, a ruling adopted only months later by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. Although there is little mention of sexplus discrimination in these watershed cases, this Article shows
how aspects of the sex-plus doctrine are interwoven throughout the
majority and concurring opinions in those cases, and argues that
sex-plus theory is a valid basis upon which to recognize sexual
orientation discrimination claims under Title VII.
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INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it
unlawful for employers to discriminate against employees
“because of . . . sex.”1 Until 2017, every United States Court
of Appeals to have interpreted Title VII’s prohibition of “sex”
discrimination had determined that it does not encompass
discrimination claims on the basis of sexual orientation.2
Times, and judicial interpretations, are changing. In
April 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit became the first federal appellate court to

1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it unlawful for an employer “to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin”).
2. See, e.g., Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017) (affirming Eleventh Circuit binding precedent
established in Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979), that
“[d]ischarge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII”); Kalich v. AT&T
Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that “[u]nder Michigan
law, as under Title VII, sexual orientation is not a protected classification”);
Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating
that “Title VII’s protections . . . do not extend to harassment due to a person’s
sexuality”); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d Cir. 2005)
(stating that “[t]he law is well-settled in this circuit and in all others to have
reached the question that . . . Title VII does not prohibit harassment or
discrimination because of sexual orientation”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that Title VII makes it unlawful
“to discriminate against any individual . . . because of . . . sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
2(a)(1), but “does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation”);
Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir.
2000) (declaring that “harassment based solely upon a person’s sexual preference
or orientation (and not on one’s sex) is not an unlawful employment practice
under Title VII”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259
(1st Cir. 1999) (stating that as a matter of “settled law,” “Title VII does not
proscribe harassment simply because of sexual orientation”); Wrightson v. Pizza
Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that “Title VII does
not afford a cause of action for discrimination based upon sexual orientation”);
Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating
that “Title VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexuals”); Blum v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that “[d]ischarge for
homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII”).
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hold that disparate treatment sexual orientation
discrimination claims are indeed encompassed within Title
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination.3 In February 2018,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held the same.4 And just a few weeks before that, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals declared, in a sexual harassment
case, that Title VII sexual orientation discrimination claims
can be brought under a “sex-plus” theory as long as the
plaintiff can prove that the discriminatory treatment she
suffered was at least partly based upon her gender.5
Although the First Circuit’s opinion recognizes that sexplus doctrine may apply in the context of sexual orientation
discrimination,6 there is little mention of sex-plus
discrimination in the watershed Seventh and Second Circuit
opinions,7 which involve claims of disparate treatment

3. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 351-52 (7th Cir.
2017); see also Brian Soucek, Hively’s Self-Induced Blindness, 127 YALE L.J. F.
115, 115–16 (2017) (noting that in Hively, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
became “the first federal court of appeals to declare that sexual orientation
discrimination necessarily comprises sex discrimination under Title VII,” and
describing Hively as “the most important legal success for LGBT rights since the
marriage rulings”).
4. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018).
5. See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[W]e
do not believe [our prior precedent] forecloses a plaintiff in our Circuit from
bringing sex-plus claims under Title VII where, in addition to the sex-based
charge, the ‘plus’ factor is the plaintiff’s status as a gay or lesbian individual. . . .
[W]e see no reason why claims where the “plus-factor” is sexual orientation would
not be viable if the gay or lesbian plaintiff asserting the claim also demonstrates
that he or she was discriminated at least in part because of his or her gender.”).
6. See id.
7. The only references to sex-plus discrimination in these opinions include a
cursory dismissal of the doctrine by a dissenting opinion in the Second Circuit
case. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2018)
(Lynch, J., dissenting) (stating that “sex-plus” discrimination claims typically
“single out for disfavored status traits that are, for example, common to women
but rare in men”); id. at 152 n.20 (acknowledging that “discrimination against a
subcategory of members of one sex is also prohibited by Title VII,” and stating
that “[a]n employer that hires gay men but refuses to hire lesbians, or vice versa,
would thus be in violation of the statute”).
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(intentional) discrimination.8 Nevertheless, this Article
shows how aspects of the sex-plus doctrine are woven
throughout the Seventh and Second Circuit opinions. From
there, this Article argues that Title VII sexual orientation
discrimination claims are in fact cognizable under the sexplus doctrine, and contends that as other courts and litigants
revisit whether Title VII applies to such claims, including the
United States Supreme Court,9 they should phrase the issue
in sex-plus terms.10 As a wise Notre Dame Law Professor,
Professor G. Robert Blakey, once instructed me: if you can
determine how a legal issue is phrased, you can almost
assuredly win the debate.11 That advice rings true when
phrasing a Title VII sexual orientation discrimination claim
as a sex-plus issue.
To briefly explain the argument, discrimination claims
usually involve an employer treating an employee in a
particular protected class differently than those outside the
employee’s protected class, such as where an employer
promotes male but not equally-qualified female employees,12
or where an employer imposes different workplace
8. By way of background, employees alleging discrimination usually assert
one of four types of claims: (1) disparate treatment, see, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988) (explaining that disparate treatment
claims involve allegations of intentional discrimination); (2) disparate impact,
see, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (authorizing
disparate impact claims under Title VII); (3) harassment, see, e.g., Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (authorizing sexual harassment
claims under Title VII); and (4) retaliation, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012)
(making it unlawful under Title VII “for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed”
discriminatory actions prohibited by Title VII).
9. Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (granting certiorari
to review the Second Circuit’s decision holding that sexual orientation
discrimination is a form of gender discrimination under Title VII).
10. Cf. Soucek, supra note 3, at 115–16 (noting that the Hively ruling “will
hopefully inspire other courts to embrace its result”).
11. Information about Professor Blakey can be found at the following
webpage: https://law.nd.edu/directory/g-blakey/.
12. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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requirements on employees of different races.13 Sex-plus
discrimination claims do not involve such categorically
distinct treatment of an entire protected group.14 Rather, in
sex-plus discrimination scenarios, an employer exercises a
more specific type of sex-based animus targeting only a
certain segment of males or females on the basis of both the
employee’s sex and another “plus” factor, as when an
employer treats women with children differently than men
with children due to the employer’s stereotypical belief that
such women, but not such men, will be unproductive or
unreliable employees.15 At its core, then, sex-plus
discrimination claims “are a flavor of gender discrimination
claims” in which an employer discriminates against a
particular segment of males or females on the basis of sex
(e.g., female) plus another characteristic (e.g., child care
responsibilities).16 This is precisely the case for sexual
orientation discrimination claims.
Take, for example, a sexual orientation discrimination
claim brought by a lesbian employee alleging she was fired
due to her employer’s discriminatory animus against
homosexuals. Here, the plaintiff’s claim would not be one of

13. See, e.g., Vazquez v. Caesar’s Palace Stream Resort, No. 3-CV-09-0625,
2013 WL 6244568 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013) (plaintiff, an African-American
employee, brought successful race discrimination claim where she was fired for
wearing her hair in braids while a white employee was not).
14. See Franchina, 881 F.3d at 53 (declaring that “discrimination against one
employee cannot be remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another
employee in that same group”).
15. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall,
J., concurring); see also Smith v. AVSC Int’l, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that the “sex plus” theory “recognizes that it is
impermissible to treat men with an additional characteristic more or less
favorably than women with the same additional characteristic”); Chadwick v.
WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing sex-plus
discrimination and concluding that, under Title VII, “an employer is not free to
assume that a woman, because she is a woman, will necessarily be a poor worker
because of family responsibilities”).
16. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 52.
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pure gender discrimination, as the plaintiff would not argue
that her gender alone led to her termination.17 Rather, the
claim would be more specific, and would allege that the
plaintiff’s gender combined with her particular sexual
preferences are what motivated the employer’s adverse
action.18
In the example of a lesbian employee who is treated
differently than her work colleagues due to her sexual
orientation, the “plus” characteristic that matters is the fact
of being attracted to females, as opposed to males, as it is this
particular “plus” factor that triggers the employer’s
discriminatory animus.19 In this context, it would be easy for
the plaintiff to prove that males who were likewise attracted
to females were treated more favorably, such that simply
changing the plaintiff’s sex would eradicate the employer’s
animus.20 In this sense, the plaintiff’s sex is “a motivating
factor” in the employer’s decision, and Title VII requires no
more proof than that.21 Accordingly, discrimination on the

17. See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 358 (7th
Cir. 2017) (Flaum, J., concurring) (explaining that Hively did not allege that the
College refused to promote women more generally).
18. See id. (“There is no allegation . . . that the College refused to promote
women; nor is there an allegation that it refused to promote those who associate
with women. Rather, Ivy Tech’s alleged animus was against Professor Hively
[based on] a combination of these two factors.” (emphasis added)).
19. See id. (articulating the plaintiff’s argument as follows: “Professor Hively
argues that [in refusing to promote her] the College relied on her sex, because,
but for her sex, she would not have been denied a promotion (i.e., she would not
have been denied a promotion if she were a man who was sexually attracted to
women) [emphasis in original].”).
20. Cf. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 52–53 (1st Cir. 2018) (rejecting defendant’s
argument that a lesbian plaintiff alleging sexual harassment under a sex-plus
theory must present evidence of a comparative class of gay males who were not
discriminated against).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this
subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.”).
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basis of sex has necessarily occurred.22 The fact that the
plaintiff’s sexual preference is also a motivating factor does
not change the outcome; it simply makes the sex
discrimination claim a sex-plus claim, given that it is the
plaintiff’s sex combined with her specific sexual preference
that triggers the employer’s discriminatory animus.23
Accordingly, sex-plus discrimination is a strong foundation
upon which to base claims of sexual orientation
discrimination.
Part I of this Article summarizes the primary theories
and rationales applied by courts when validating sex
discrimination claims. Part II then examines the sex-plus
discrimination doctrine in detail, and provides examples
where the doctrine has been applied. Part III summarizes
federal appellate court opinions, mostly from an earlier era
of jurisprudence, refusing to extend Title VII’s protections to
sexual orientation discrimination claims. Part IV details the
Second and Seventh Circuit cases extending Title VII to
sexual orientation discrimination claims, and demonstrates
how the key rationales set forth in these cases mirror sexplus discrimination doctrine. Finally, Part V argues that sexplus theory is a valid basis upon which to recognize Title VII
claims of sexual orientation discrimination. Part VI
concludes.
I.

SEX DISCRIMINATION THEORIES AND RATIONALES

Employment discrimination statutes prohibit employers
from discriminating against employees or job applicants due
to certain protected characteristics, such as a person’s race

22. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (majority opinion) (“Hively alleges that if she
had been a man married to a woman . . . and everything else had stayed the
same, Ivy Tech would not have refused to promote her and would not have fired
her. . . . This describes paradigmatic sex discrimination. . . . Ivy Tech is
disadvantaging her because she is a woman.”).
23. See discussion infra Part V.
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or sex.24 Regardless of the protected characteristic at issue,
victims of employment discrimination usually pursue one of
four types of claims: disparate treatment,25 disparate
impact,26 harassment,27 or retaliation.28 Although all four
types of claims are generally available across the federal
anti-discrimination
statutes,
plaintiffs
alleging
discrimination usually advance claims of disparate
treatment, which require proof of intentional discrimination,
24. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29
U.S.C. § 623(a) (2012) (making it unlawful to discriminate against employees on
the basis of age); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (making it unlawful for an
employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin”); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012) (making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate on
the basis of disability). Other significant federal statutes include the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)
(2012) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of genetic information); the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (stating that Title VII’s
prohibition against sex discrimination applies to discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy); and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), Pub. L. No.
93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012)) (prohibiting
discrimination against federal government employees based on disabilities).
25. E.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988).
26. E.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (authorizing
disparate impact claims under the ADEA); see also Griggs v. Duke Power, 401
U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (authorizing disparate impact claims under Title VII).
27. E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986)
(authorizing sexual harassment claims under Title VII); Rickard v. Swedish
Match N. Am., Inc., 773 F.3d 181, 184–85 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing workplace
harassment claims based on either sex or age).
28. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012) (making it unlawful under Title VII
“for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter”); 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012) (making it unlawful
under the ADEA “for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any
practice made unlawful by [the ADEA], or because such individual . . . has made
a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or litigation under this chapter”).
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or claims of disparate impact, which do not.29 This Article
focuses primarily on disparate treatment claims.
The most comprehensive federal statute governing
employment discrimination is Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful for employers to
discriminate on the basis of “sex.”30 The most obvious
instance of sex discrimination is when an employer favors
men over women, or vice versa,31 as when an employer
chooses not to hire women or men for a particular job.32 Title
VII encompasses more than such obvious instances of sex
discrimination, however, including for example, claims based
on sexual harassment in the workplace.33
Although the following list is not intended to be
exhaustive, there are at least four major rationales advanced
by courts when recognizing more subtle forms of sex
discrimination under Title VII. The most overarching
rationale is equal employment opportunity, which “requires
that persons of like qualifications be given employment
opportunities irrespective of their sex,” a rationale that has
been invoked to strike down separate hiring policies for men
and women that deny employment opportunities to one
gender.34 A second rationale is based on the relatively

29. Watson, 487 U.S. at 986–87.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
31. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 334 (5th Cir. 2019).
32. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir.
2017).
33. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
34. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (declaring that
Title VII “requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment
opportunities irrespective of their sex,” such that the statute does not permit “one
hiring policy for women and another for men”); see also Int’l Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187, 199–200 (1991) (striking down employer’s policy barring fertile
women, but not fertile men, from jobs entailing high levels of lead exposure, and
declaring that such an “explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination under
[Title VII]”).
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unequal burdens sometimes imposed upon the sexes. Under
this rationale, unlawful sex discrimination occurs when an
employer imposes unreasonably unequal burdens on males
and females in similar positions, such as when an employer
disciplines female, but not male, employees based on their
weight.35 A third theory is sex stereotyping. Under this
framework, unlawful sex discrimination would occur when
an employer takes action against an employee based on the
employee’s failure to conform to the employer’s stereotyped
characterization of the sexes, as where a female employee is
denied a promotion because she does not meet the employer’s
expectation of how a female should behave in the
workplace.36 Somewhat differently, sex stereotyping might
occur when an employer takes an adverse action against a
male or female based on the employer’s stereotypical
assumption of how such a person would likely behave in the
workplace; this particular type of sex stereotyping would
occur, for example, if an employer refuses to hire women with
children, but not men with children, on the belief that such
women would inevitably be bad employees.37 Yet another
35. Compare Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000)
(striking down a weight policy under which women were forced to meet the
requirements of a medium body frame standard while men were required to meet
the more generous requirements of a large body frame standard because the
policy did not impose equal burdens on the sexes, but instead categorically
“applie[d] less favorably to one gender”), with Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating
Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109–11 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (rejecting Title VII claim of
sex discrimination based on a policy under which female bartenders were
required to wear makeup while male bartenders were prohibited from doing so,
and finding that minor differences in appearance requirements do not impose
unreasonably unequal burdens on either males or females).
36. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989) (adopting the
sex stereotyping theory and stating that “we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group”).
37. See, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45–48 (1st Cir. 2009);
see also Zachary R. Herz, Price’s Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for
Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396, 405 (2014) (describing the employer’s
application of such stereotypical assumptions in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971)).
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rationale underlying certain claims of sex discrimination,
one that is the focus of this Article, is sex-plus
discrimination.
II. SEX-PLUS DISCRIMINATION
Under the sex-plus discrimination doctrine, a plaintiff,
often female, may bring a Title VII claim for sex
discrimination if she can show that her employer
discriminated against her not because of her gender per se,
but because of the combination of her gender plus some
additional factor, such as having young children.38 As courts
have developed the doctrine, the additional “plus” factor in a
sex-plus case must pertain either to an immutable
characteristic or the exercise of a fundamental right.39 This
section examines these two types of sex-plus discrimination
claims, and section V shows how each of these types of sexplus claims are applicable in cases involving sexual
orientation discrimination.
A. Sex-Plus
Discrimination
Fundamental Right

Claims

Involving

a

The United States Supreme Court first ratified the
notion that Title VII could be violated by an employer’s
discriminatory treatment of a subclass of women in Phillips
v. Martin Marietta Corp.40 In Phillips, the Court declared
that sex discrimination may occur through a policy of
refusing to employ women, but not men, with pre-school aged

38. See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018)
(recognizing that in sex-plus claims, “the simple question posed . . . is whether
the employer took an adverse employment action at least in part because of an
employee’s sex,” and applying the sex-plus theory to plaintiffs who were allegedly
discriminated against at least in part because of their gender where the “plusfactor” is sexual orientation).
39. Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir.
1980); Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
40. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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children.41 As the Phillips Court explained, Title VII
“requires that persons of like qualifications be given
employment opportunities irrespective of their sex,” a
principle violated by the employer’s gender-based hiring
policies.42 Importantly, Phillips established that when an
employer discriminates against a particular subgroup of
women, such as women with children, the employer may not
defend its actions with evidence that it does not discriminate
against women on the whole.43 The Court thus deemed it
irrelevant that at least 75 percent of the persons hired for the
position at issue in that case were women (albeit those
without children), given that discrimination had occurred
against a more specific subgroup of females—i.e., those with
young children.44
In a more recent example where the “plus” factor in a
sex-plus claim involved the exercise of a fundamental right,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered a
discrimination claim brought by school psychologist, Elana
Back, after she was denied tenure due to an alleged
stereotypical view that young mothers could not balance both
work and home obligations.45 Treating the case as one of sex
stereotyping against the particular segment of women with
children, the court noted that, as in Phillips, “discrimination
against one employee cannot be cured . . . solely by
favorable . . . treatment of other employees of the

41. Id. at 544.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 543–44 (finding that a policy of refusing to hire women with preschool age children discriminates on the basis of sex even though at least 75% of
those hired for the position were women).
44. See id.
45. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 115
(2d Cir. 2004) (describing the alleged stereotyping behavior). Notably, Back
brought her sex discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause, which
the court found to encompass sex-plus claims. Id. at 118–19.
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same . . . sex,”46 as the question is whether Back herself was
discriminated against under Title VII on the basis of her
sex.47 Accordingly, the court rejected the employer’s
argument that it was immune from Back’s allegations of
gender discrimination simply because 85% of the school’s
teachers were women, and 71% of these women had
children.48 Rather, “what matters is how Back was
treated.”49 And on this point, the court found evidence that
the decision makers who denied Back tenure had stereotyped
her “as a woman and mother of young children, and thus
treated her differently than they would have treated a man
and father of young children.”50 Such evidence, according to
the court, was enough for Back’s discrimination claim to
survive summary judgment.51
In another case involving a sex-plus discrimination claim
with a “plus” characteristic involving a fundamental right,
McGrenaghan v. St. Denis School, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that a
teacher could maintain a Title VII sex discrimination claim
as a member of a subclass of women with disabled children.52
There, the court found evidence of discriminatory animus
against mothers with disabled children, including direct

46. Id. at 121 (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
47. Id. at 122. This point was later reiterated by the United States Supreme
Court. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–55 (1982) (stating that the
purpose of Title VII “is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the
protection of the minority group as a whole,” and explaining that in enacting Title
VII, “Congress never intended to give an employer license to discriminate against
some employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats
other members of the employees’ group”).
48. Back, 365 F.3d at 122.
49. Id. at 122.
50. Id. at 130; see also id. at 124 (analyzing the evidence of discriminatory
motives and comments of plaintiff’s supervisors, Brennan and Wishnie).
51. Id. at 130. Notably, summary judgment was denied only against the
actual decision makers in Back’s case. See id.
52. 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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evidence of discriminatory animus by the school’s principal.53
The court thus rejected the defendant’s argument that it
could not be liable for sex discrimination given that the
person ultimately hired for the position was also a woman,
reasoning that the person hired was “not a member of the
subclass of women with disabled children” to which plaintiff
belonged.54
Phillips, Back, and McGrenaghan are examples of sexplus discrimination claims brought by female employees
treated differently for having children.55 Courts have
recognized similar subclasses of women based on their
exercise of other fundamental rights.56 Courts have found,
for example, that an employer’s unfavorable treatment of
married women, as compared to married men, violates Title
VII.57

53. Id.
54. Id. Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment to the defendant on
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim. Id.
55. See also Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2009)
(denying summary judgment to defendant-employer on similar sex-plus
discrimination claim); Philipsen v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV11977-DT, 2007 WL 907822, at *6–9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (recognizing a
similar claim, but granting summary judgment to the defendant on plaintiff’s
“sex plus” claim due to a lack of evidence that plaintiff was treated differently
than males with young children).
56. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033.
57. See, e.g., Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 108 F.3d 1199,
1202–05 (10th Cir. 1997) (in sex-plus marital status claim, ruling that a female
plaintiff must show that her male co-workers with the same marital status were
treated differently, and reversing jury verdict for plaintiff due to a lack of
evidence on that point); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198
(7th Cir. 1971) (finding employer’s no-marriage rule for stewardesses to violate
Title VII); Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884, 888 (M.D.
Tenn. 2004) (recognizing a sex-plus claim on the basis of sex-plus marital and
family status, but ultimately dismissing plaintiff’s claim because she failed to
raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial on the issue of pretext); Rauw v.
Glickman, No. CV–99–1482–ST, 2001 WL 34039494, at *8 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2001)
(authorizing a sex-plus marital status claim under Title VII); Jurinko v. Wiegand
Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (refusal to hire married women
violated Title VII).
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In the sex-plus marital status cases, as in Phillips, Back,
and McGrenaghan, courts have rejected employer arguments
that no discrimination occurred “on the basis of sex” because
the employer did not discriminate against women as a
whole.58 In one such case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit noted that an employer’s no-marriage
rule, which it applied to female flight stewardesses but not
their male counterparts, violated Title VII even though the
rule did not apply to all female employees, “for so long as sex
is a factor in the application of the rule, such application
involves a discrimination based on sex.”59 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit declared, Title VII’s effect “is not to be diluted
because discrimination adversely affects only a portion of the
protected class.”60 As another court in a similar case
declared, “[i]f [a] company discriminates against married
women, but not against married men, the variable[s]
become[] [men and] women, and the discrimination, based on
solely sexual distinctions, invidious and unlawful.”61
B. Sex-Plus Discrimination Claims Involving Immutable
Characteristics
As noted, the sex-plus theory applies when an employer
discriminates against a particular subclass of males or
females based on the exercise of a fundamental right, such
as the right to marry or have children;62 or an immutable
characteristic, such as the plaintiff’s race.63

58. Jurinko, 331 F. Supp. at 1187 (rejecting the argument).
59. Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (adopting the reasoning of the EEOC, as
expressed in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a)).
60. Id.
61. Jurinko, 331 F. Supp. at 1187.
62. See supra Part II.A.
63. See Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Nicole
Buonocore Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women
Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 87 (2003).
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Immutable characteristics are simply those the
employee cannot change.64 In the past 50 years, courts have
recognized various Title VII “plus claims” involving a
combination of immutable characteristics. Exemplary claims
include those based on sex-plus-race (e.g., alleging
discrimination against black females65 or against Asian
females66), race-plus-religion (e.g., alleging discrimination
against a white Jewish male67), and sex-plus-age (e.g.,
involving discrimination against older women68). This
section summarizes a few leading cases.
In one case alleging discrimination on the basis of sexplus-race, Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action
Association, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit recognized a subclass of black women for purposes of
Title VII discrimination analysis.69 In that case, plaintiff
Dafro Jefferies, a black female, alleged that her employer
discriminated against her due to her race and sex.70 The
district court separated Jefferies’ single sex-plus-race claim
into distinct claims of race discrimination and sex

64. David Schraub, Unsuspecting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 361, 378 (2016) (citing
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)).
65. See e.g., Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1034 (recognizing a subclass of black women
or a sex-plus-race claim).
66. See e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Hawai’i, 40 F.3d 1551, 1561–62 (9th Cir. 1994)
(recognizing a subclass of Asian women or a sex-plus-race claim).
67. See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 153 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding
sufficient evidence “to support an inference that [Feingold] was terminated on
the basis of his religion and/or race”).
68. See, e.g., Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., Inc., No. C/A3:08-4132-JFAPJG,
2010 WL 1052082, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2010).
69. 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 1028. In her complaint, Jefferies charged that HCCAA
discriminated against her in promotion “because she is a woman, up in age and
because she is Black.” Id. at 1029. Jefferies’ age-based discrimination claim,
however, did not materialize as a live issue at trial, and was not before the court
on appeal. Id. at 1030.
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discrimination.71 This, in turn, allowed the district court to
reject Jefferies’ race discrimination claim based on evidence
that the promotion she sought was instead filled by a black
male.72 The district court then rejected Jefferies’ sex
discrimination claim due to evidence that 60–70 percent of
the defendant’s employees were female, who often held
important positions within the organization.73
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the
district court’s decision for having improperly separated
Jefferies’ plus discrimination claim into distinct race and sex
discrimination claims.74 The court reasoned that
discrimination against black females can exist even in the
absence of discrimination against black men or white
women.75 Describing “black females as a distinct protected
subgroup,” the court concluded that “when a Title VII
plaintiff alleges that an employer discriminates against
black females, the fact that black males and white females
are not subject to discrimination is irrelevant,”76 particularly
when invoked to disprove discrimination in the case at hand,
as black men and white women must be treated as persons
outside the subclass of black females.77

71. Id. at 1032 (explaining that the district court did not analyze whether the
plaintiff was discriminated against “based on a combination of race and sex,” and
instead “separately addressed Jefferies’ claims of race discrimination and sex
discrimination”).
72. See id. at 1028, 1030 (rejecting Jefferies’ claim of pure race discrimination
in promotion, given that the person promoted to the position at issue was also
black).
73. Id. at 1029–31.
74. Id. at 1032.
75. Id. at 1034.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1032; see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 (1991) (“[T]he experiences of women of color are frequently
the product of intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, and . . . tend not to be
represented within the discourses of either feminism or antiracism.”).
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Since Jefferies, numerous courts have ratified sex-plus
claims by subclasses of employees in similar circumstances.78
In one case, Lam v. University of Hawai’i, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized a Title VII
sex-plus-race discrimination claim brought by an Asian
woman of Vietnamese descent.79 In that case, Maivan Clech
Lam filed a lawsuit claiming the University of Hawai’i’s Law
School discriminated against her on the basis of her race, sex,
and national origin, when it twice rejected her application for
a faculty position.80 After losing at trial, Lam appealed.81
Examining the initial rejection of Lam’s application, and
focusing specifically on Lam’s allegations of race and sex
discrimination, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared
that, “[o]n summary judgment, the existence of a
discriminatory motive for the employment decision will

78. See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416–17 (10th Cir.
1987) (adopting the reasoning of Jefferies in recognizing a sex-plus-race hostile
work environment claim); Robertson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:14-CV01861 (VLB), 2017 WL 326317, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2017) (recognizing that
“[a] plaintiff may bring a [discrimination] claim under a combination of two
protected grounds of Title VII, such as race and gender”); Walton v. Vilsack, No.
CIV.A. 09-7627, 2011 WL 3489967, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2011) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that a plaintiff cannot present evidence of discrimination
against her as an African-American female); Johnson v. Dillard’s Inc., No. 3:03–
3445–MBS, 2007 WL 2792232, at *3–5 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007) (in a lengthy
discussion of the issue, recognizing a combination claim alleging race plus sex
discrimination under Title VII); Nieto v. Kapoor, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1140
(D.N.M. 2000) (considering evidence of harassment based on both race and their
sex); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 944 (D. Neb. 1986), aff’d
sub nom. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987)
(treating plaintiff’s race and gender discrimination claims as involving “the class
of black women”); Graham v. Bendix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind.
1984) (“Under Title VII, the plaintiff as a black woman is protected against
discrimination on the double grounds of race and sex, and an employer who
singles out black females for less favorable treatment does not defeat plaintiff’s
case by showing that white females or black males are not so unfavorably
treated.”).
79. 40 F.3d 1551, 1561 n.16, 1561–62 (9th Cir. 1994).
80. Id. at 1554, 1558.
81. Id. at 1558.
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generally be the principal question.”82 And on that issue,
Lam presented testimony that the Chair of the appointments
committee, Professor A., had a biased attitude towards
women and Asians.83 According to the Ninth Circuit, this
evidence was sufficient to preclude summary judgment for
the defendants.84
As in Jefferies, the Ninth Circuit in Lam found it
erroneous for the district court to have relied on the
defendants’ favorable treatment of two other candidates for
the faculty position at issue: one an Asian man (tending to
defeat a claim of pure race discrimination), and the other a
white woman (tending to defeat a claim of pure sex
discrimination).85 According to the Ninth Circuit, the district
court apparently viewed racism and sexism as “distinct
elements amenable to almost mathematical treatment, so
that evaluating discrimination against an Asian woman
became a simple matter of performing two separate tasks:
looking for racism ‘alone’ and looking for sexism ‘alone,’ with
Asian men and white women as the corresponding model
victims.”86 This slicing and dicing of Lam’s plusdiscrimination claim, according to the Ninth Circuit, failed
to account for the fact that “Asian women are subject to a set
of stereotypes and assumptions shared neither by Asian men
nor by white women,”87 such that Asian women may be
targeted for discrimination “even in the absence of

82. Id. at 1559.
83. Id. at 1560.
84. Id. In reaching this result, the court also noted that Lam had presented
evidence that another professor who participated in the hiring process had stated
that the new hire should be male. Id.
85. Id. at 1561.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1562. Here, the court noted in a footnote that Asian women are
subject to particular stereotypes such as geisha, dragon lady, concubine, and
lotus blossom. Id. at 1562 n.21.
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discrimination against [Asian] men or white women.”88
Accordingly, the court determined that “when a plaintiff is
claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to determine
whether the employer discriminates on the basis of that
combination of factors, not just whether it discriminates
against people of the same race or of the same sex.”89
C. Plus Factors Not Involving a Fundamental Right or
Immutable Characteristic
The sex-plus theory of discrimination is not without
limitation.90 For example, courts have rejected sex-plus
discrimination claims in the context of gender differentiated
appearance requirements, such as employer policies
imposing different makeup or hair length requirements for
men and women.91 This is because, unlike valid sex-plus
claims, the “plus” factors in these cases do not involve an
immutable characteristic such as race or national origin, or
a constitutionally protected fundamental right such as
marriage or child rearing.92
In limiting sex-plus discrimination claims in this
manner, courts have highlighted Title VII’s objective of
ensuring equal job opportunity for males and females based
on their qualifications, rather than their sex.93 The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has explained that
“[e]qual employment opportunity may be secured only when
employers are barred from discriminating against employees
88. Id. at 1562 (quoting Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d
1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980)).
89. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
90. See Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033–34.
91. See, e.g., Knott v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1250–52 (8th Cir.
1975) (rejecting sex-plus discrimination under Title VII based on minor
differences resulting from hair length limitations for male employees but not for
female employees).
92. Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1033.
93. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975).
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on the basis of immutable characteristics . . . [or] some
fundamental right.”94 “But a hiring policy that distinguishes
on some other ground, such as grooming codes or length of
hair, is related more closely to the employer’s choice of how
to run his business than to equality of employment
opportunity.”95
In Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied these principles to a
male job applicant’s sex-plus discrimination claim based on
an employer’s differing hair length requirements for men
and women.96 The court first found that because hair length
can be easily changed, it is not an immutable
characteristic.97 Likewise, the court noted, hair length is
unlike having pre-school age children, which is “an existing
condition not subject to change.”98 Accordingly, the court
declared, “[i]f [an] employee objects to [such a] grooming code
he has the right to reject it by looking elsewhere for
employment, or alternatively he may choose to subordinate
his preference by accepting the code along with the job.”99
Other courts agree with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis. As
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
explained, different grooming and appearance standards for
men and women, such as different hair length requirements,
are merely “classifications by sex which do not limit
employment opportunities by making distinctions based on
immutable personal characteristics, which do not represent
any attempt by the employer to prevent the employment of a
particular sex, and which do not pose distinct employment

94. Id. (emphasis in original).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1086.
97. Id. at 1091 (“Hair length is not immutable and in the situation of employer
vis à vis employee enjoys no constitutional protection.”).
98. Id.
99. Id.
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disadvantages for one sex.”100 Accordingly, the sex-plus
discrimination doctrine may not be used to challenge such
classifications.101
III. COURTS REJECTING TITLE VII SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Before 2017, essentially every federal appellate court
had rejected the argument that Title VII permits claims of
sexual orientation discrimination as a form of “sex”
discrimination.102 Nevertheless, nearly two dozen state
legislatures have now included “sexual orientation” as a
distinct protected characteristic under their own state antidiscrimination statutes, effectively making the employment
rights of gays and lesbians dependent on the state in which
the person lives and works.103 Additionally, in 2015, the

100. Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1336–37 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
101. Id. at 1337.
102. See supra note 2.
103. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2019) (generally prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of “race, religious creed, color, national
origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, genetic
information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression, age,
sexual orientation, or military and veteran status”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34402(1)(a) (2019) (making it generally unlawful for an employer to discriminate on
the basis of “sexual orientation,” among other things); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a81c (2019) (generally prohibiting discrimination in employment “because of [an]
individual’s sexual orientation or civil union status”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 711(a)(1) (2019) (making it generally unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against any individual “because of such individual’s . . . sexual orientation,
gender identity,” or other protected characteristics); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2
(2019) (generally prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of “race,
sex including gender identity or expression, sexual orientation,” and other
protected characteristics); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(A) (2019) (stating a public
policy of securing freedom from discrimination because of, among other things,
“sexual orientation”); IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2019) (making it generally unlawful to
discriminate against applicants for employment or employees because of, among
other things, the individual’s “sexual orientation” or “gender identity”); ME. STAT.
tit. 5, § 4571 (2019) (recognizing as a civil right “[t]he opportunity for an
individual to secure employment without discrimination because of . . . sexual
orientation”); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 20-606(a)(1) (West 2019) (making it
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
determined that “allegations of discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of
discrimination on the basis of sex” under Title VII.104
Applying a sex stereotyping analysis, the EEOC based its
ruling in part on the notion that a person claiming sexual
orientation discrimination often fails to live up to the
employer’s “fundamental sex stereotype, norm, or
expectation that individuals should be attracted only to those
of the opposite sex.”105
Although not binding on courts, the EEOC’s ruling
prompted courts to re-examine whether Title VII permits
claims of sexual orientation discrimination as an instance of
sex discrimination.106 In 2017, a three-judge panel of the
generally unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of, among other
things, “sexual orientation” or “gender identity”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4
(2019) (making it generally unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an
individual “because of” the person’s “sexual orientation” or “gender identity,”
among other protected characteristics); MINN. STAT. § 363A.08 (2019) (making it
“an unfair employment practice for an employer” to discriminate against an
individual because of her “sexual orientation,” among other protected
characteristics); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.330 (2019) (making it unlawful “[t]o fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any person, or otherwise to discriminate against
any person with respect to the person’s compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, gender identity or expression, age, disability or national origin”); see
also State Maps of Laws & Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
https://www.hrc.org/state-maps/employment (last updated June 7, 2019)
(summarizing state laws prohibiting sexual orientation and gender identity
discrimination, including those noted above along with laws from New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin).
104. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at
*10 (July 15, 2015).
105. Id. (“An employee could show that the sexual orientation discrimination
he or she experienced was sex discrimination because it involved treatment that
would not have occurred but for the individual’s sex; because it was based on the
sex of the person(s) the individual associates with; and/or because it was
premised on the fundamental sex stereotype, norm, or expectation that
individuals should be attracted only to those of the opposite sex.”).
106. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 344 (7th Cir.
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United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
revisited this issue in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital.107
This decision is significant, in that it steadfastly rejects
sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title VII,
despite the EEOC’s changed position on the issue.108
In Evans, plaintiff Jameka Evans sued her former
employer, Georgia Regional Hospital, alleging that she was
discriminated against on the basis of her sex for failing to
carry herself in a “traditional woman[ly] manner,” adding
that although she did not openly broadcast her sexual
orientation, it was “evident” that she identified with the male
gender because of her “male uniform, low male haircut,
shoes, etc.”109 Reading Evans’s complaint as presenting
separate claims for discrimination based on sexual
orientation (for being a gay female) and gender nonconformity (for appearing male), a magistrate judge issued a
report and recommendation (“R&R”) recommending
dismissal of all of Evans’s claims with prejudice.110 The
magistrate judge reasoned that Title VII “was not intended
to cover discrimination against homosexuals,”111 and that
Evans’s gender non-conformity claim was “just another way

2017).
107. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017).
108. See id. at 1255–56; see also Bostock v. Clayton Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 894
F.3d 1335, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018) (refusing to grant a rehearing en banc on a
similar Title VII issue); cf. Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 915 F.3d 328, 333 (5th Cir.
2019) (declining to reach the issue of whether to overrule Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979), which held that sexual orientation discrimination
is not unlawful under Title VII, but noting that “Blum remains binding precedent
in this circuit to this day”).
109. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1250.
110. See Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., No. CV415-103, 2015 WL 5316694, at
*2–3 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV415103, 2015 WL 6555440 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 29, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
remanded, 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017).
111. Id. at *2.
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to claim discrimination based on sexual orientation.”112 The
district court later adopted the R&R and dismissed the case
with prejudice.113
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Evans argued that
the district court erred in dismissing both her gender nonconformity and sexual orientation discrimination claims.114
Given the procedural posture of the case, the Eleventh
Circuit began by noting that to survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must simply contain enough factual matter that,
accepted as true, “states a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face.”115 The court then found that Evans’s complaint
failed to meet this standard as to both claims.116
Regarding her gender non-conformity claim, the court
determined that a claim of sex discrimination based on
gender non-conformity is indeed actionable,117 and is not
“just another way to claim discrimination based on sexual
orientation,” as the district court had determined.118
Nevertheless, the court found that Evans’s complaint failed
to plead sufficient facts to create a plausible inference that
she suffered discrimination on this basis.119 Accordingly, the
court remanded to permit Evans to amend that claim.120

112. Id. at *3.
113. Evans v. Georgia Reg’l Hosp., No. CV415-103, 2015 WL 6555440, at *1
(S.D. Ga. Oct. 29, 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 850 F.3d 1248
(11th Cir. 2017).
114. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1253.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1253–58.
117. Id. at 1254 (stating that “[d]iscrimination based on failure to conform to a
gender stereotype is sex-based discrimination”).
118. Id. at 1254–55 (stating its holding on this issue as follows: “[w]e hold that
the lower court erred because a gender non-conformity claim is not ‘just another
way to claim discrimination based on sexual orientation,’ but instead, constitutes
a separate, distinct avenue for relief under Title VII.”).
119. Id. at 1254.
120. Id. at 1255.
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More importantly, the court then affirmed the district
court’s
dismissal
of
Evans’s
sexual
orientation
121
discrimination claim. The Evans majority provided three
primary reasons for this decision.122 First, the court felt
restrained by Eleventh Circuit precedent foreclosing such
claims,123 which in the Eleventh Circuit must be followed
until overruled by the court en banc or by the Supreme
Court.124 Second, the Evans majority, as well as Judge
William Pryor’s concurring opinion, reasoned that at the
time of its decision (prior to Hively and Zarda), essentially
all other federal circuits had determined that sexual
orientation discrimination is not actionable under Title
VII.125 As the Evans opinions pointed out, courts have
generally rejected such claims under Title VII because
“sexual orientation” is not itself a protected class under that
statute.126 And in Judge Pryor’s view, Congress, rather than
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1255–57.
123. Id. at 1255 (quoting Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938 (5th Cir.
1979)) (“Discharge for homosexuality is not prohibited by Title VII.”).
124. Id. (quoting Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Lynch, 741 F.3d 1251,
1256 (11th Cir. 2014)).
125. See id. at 1256–57 (citing cases); id. at 1261 (Pryor, J., concurring).
126. See id. at 1261 (Pryor, J., concurring); id. at 1272 (Rosenbaum, J.,
dissenting); see also, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th
Cir. 2006) (stating that “sexual orientation is not a prohibited basis for
discriminatory acts under Title VII”); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260
F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that Title VII makes it unlawful “to
discriminate against any individual . . . because of . . . sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
2(a)(1), but “does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation”);
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (“The law is well-settled in
this circuit and in all others to have reached the question that Simonton has no
cause of action under Title VII because Title VII does not prohibit harassment or
discrimination because of sexual orientation.”); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. &
Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled by Hively v.
Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating that
“[s]exual orientation is not a classification that is protected under Title VII; thus
homosexuals are not members of a protected class under the law”); Higgins v.
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]e are
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courts, should decide whether Title VII applies to sexual
orientation discrimination claims.127 Finally, both the Evans
majority and Judge Pryor’s concurring opinion rejected
Evans’s argument that the Supreme Court’s sex stereotyping
precedent, Price Waterhouse, paves the way for sexual
orientation discrimination claims under Title VII, reasoning
that Price Waterhouse does not “squarely address whether
sexual orientation discrimination is prohibited by Title
VII.”128
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court ruled that Title
VII’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination encompasses
employment decisions based on gender stereotypes.129 In
that case, the plaintiff, a female senior manager in an
accounting firm, was denied partnership in the firm because
she was considered “too macho”; further, she was told she
could improve her chances of partnership if she were to “take
a course at charm school,” “walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry.”130 The Supreme Court ruled
that such comments could support a Title VII claim of sex
discrimination, thereby establishing that Title VII precludes
discrimination on the basis of sex stereotyping—here, due to
the employer’s belief that a female plaintiff like Hopkins
failed to look and act like a woman should look and act.131
called upon here to construe a statute as glossed by the Supreme Court, not to
make a moral judgment—and we regard it as settled law that, as drafted and
authoritatively construed, Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply
because of sexual orientation.”); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138,
143 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that “Title VII does not afford a cause of action
for discrimination based upon sexual orientation”).
127. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1261 (Pryor, J., concurring).
128. See id. at 1256 (majority opinion); id. at 1260 (Pryor, J., concurring).
129. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–52 (1989).
130. Id. at 235.
131. Id. at 250 (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must
not be, has acted on the basis of gender”); see also Evans, 850 F.3d at 1262
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Judge Pryor devoted much of his concurring opinion in
Evans to refuting the argument that discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation necessarily involves the type of
gender stereotyping condemned by the Supreme Court in
Price Waterhouse.132 Judge Pryor specifically addressed the
argument asserted by the EEOC and the Evans dissent that
“[a]ll homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to
traditional gender norms in their sexual practices.”133 This
argument is flawed, the judge declared, because not all gay
individuals behave the same or share the same interests.134
Some gay individuals, for example, “may choose not to marry
or date at all[,] or may choose a celibate lifestyle.”135 For this
reason, although any particular gay employee may attempt
to show “with enough factual evidence that she experienced
sex discrimination because her behavior deviated from a
gender stereotype held by an employer,” the court’s review of
such a claim “would rest on behavior alone,” rather than the
employee’s status as a gay individual.136 According to Judge
Pryor, a gender non-conformity claim is a “behavior-based
inquiry” under which courts consider whether an employer
“hold[s] males and females to different standards of

(Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (stating that the accounting firm in Price Waterhouse
denied Hopkins’s partnership because “she had qualities that defied stereotypes
of how women should look and act”); Herz, supra note 37, at 406–07 (describing
Price Waterhouse).
132. Evans, 850 F.3d at 1258 (Pryor, J., concurring) (writing separately “to
explain the error of the argument . . . that a person who experiences
discrimination because of sexual orientation necessarily experiences
discrimination for deviating from gender stereotypes”).
133. Id. (quoting EEOC Amicus Brief, at 14); see also id. at 1261 (Rosenbaum,
J., dissenting) (“Plain and simple, when a woman alleges, as Evans has, that she
has been discriminated against because she is a lesbian, she necessarily alleges
that she has been discriminated against because she failed to conform to the
employer’s image of what women should be—specifically, that women should be
sexually attracted to men only.”).
134. See id. at 1259 (Pryor, J., concurring).
135. Id.
136. Id.
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behavior,” whereas a sexual orientation discrimination
involves a “status”-based inquiry.137 As such, the claims are
distinct, such that sexual orientation discrimination claims,
on the whole, do not fall within the category of sex
discrimination due to gender non-conformity.138
Despite the EEOC’s ruling to the contrary, the Eleventh
Circuit in Evans held firm to the notion that Title VII does
not permit sexual orientation discrimination claims.139 The
court further clarified that a homosexual employee wishing
to claim discrimination under Title VII must instead claim
sex discrimination utilizing evidence of specific gender nonconforming behavior, as opposed to her sexual orientation
per se.140 If this interpretation of Title VII is correct, the
gender stereotyping theory espoused by the Supreme Court
in Price Waterhouse cannot justify the categorical inclusion
of sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title
VII.141 Although this interpretation is debatable,142
particularly in light of the Second and Seventh Circuit
opinions summarized below, the Eleventh Circuit is not
alone in this view.143 As such, another rationale is needed to
137. Id. at 1259–60.
138. See id. at 1260–61 (“We review claims of gender nonconformity the same
way in all appeals regardless of a plaintiff’s sexual orientation. Any correlation
that might exist between a particular sexual orientation and deviation from a
particular gender stereotype does not overcome this settled rule.”).
139. See supra notes 104–05, 121-28, and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 114–128 and accompanying text.
141. See Evans, 850 F.3d at 1258 (Pryor, J., concurring) (writing separately “to
explain the error of the argument . . . that a person who experiences
discrimination because of sexual orientation necessarily experiences
discrimination for deviating from gender stereotypes”).
142. See, e.g., Herz, supra note 37, at 422–35 (arguing that Price Waterhouse
allows courts to declare unlawful more subtle and individualized forms of sexual
orientation discrimination).
143. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763–65 (6th Cir. 2006)
(articulating a similar argument that harassment based on perceived
homosexuality is distinct from harassment based on actual and observed gender
non-conformity).
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connect sexual orientation discrimination to Title VII’s
existing prohibition of “sex” discrimination.144 As the next
section demonstrates, sex-plus theory provides the necessary
connection.
IV. COURTS AUTHORIZING TITLE VII SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
In April 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit became the first federal appeals court to hold
that Title VII permits claims of sexual orientation
discrimination as a form of sex discrimination.145 Less than
one year later, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held the same.146 This section summarizes
the major rationales offered by these two courts, and shows
how those rationales can be recharacterized in sex-plus
terms.
A. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
The Seventh Circuit case extending Title VII to claims of
sexual orientation discrimination, Hively v. Ivy Tech
Community College of Indiana, involved allegations of sexual
orientation discrimination by an openly lesbian plaintiff,
Kimberly Hively.147 Hively began teaching as a part-time,
adjunct professor at Ivy Tech Community College in 2000.148
Between 2009 and 2014, Hively applied for numerous fulltime positions with Ivy Tech, which repeatedly rejected her
144. This is not to suggest that Judge Pryor will necessarily have the final say
on the gender stereotyping theory as applied to claims of sexual orientation
discrimination. Indeed, arguments for applying the gender stereotyping theory
in this context are quite persuasive. See, e.g., Evans, 850 F.3d at 1262–69
(Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
145. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir.
2017).
146. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018).
147. Hively, 853 F.3d at 341.
148. Id.
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applications.149 After the college failed to renew her parttime contract in 2014, Hively filed an EEOC charge alleging
that she was “being discriminated against based on [her]
sexual orientation,” in violation of Title VII.150 Hively later
sued Ivy Tech in federal district court, which dismissed her
complaint on the basis that sexual orientation discrimination
is not a protected class under Title VII.151 This decision was
affirmed by a panel of judges on appeal to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals,152 after which the full court voted
to rehear the case en banc.153
Writing for the en banc court, Chief Judge Diane Wood
phrased the Title VII issue in the case as “whether actions
taken on the basis of sexual orientation are a subset of
actions taken on the basis of sex,”154 one she described as “a
pure question of statutory interpretation . . . well within the
judiciary’s competence.”155 Having established the court’s
authority to extend Title VII in this manner, the court then
rejected Ivy Tech’s argument that because Congress had not
amended Title VII to include “sexual orientation” as a
protected class under the statute, this particular claim
remains unavailable under the statute.156 According to the
court, and contrary to the opinions of most courts on this
issue,157 no reliable inference could be drawn from Congress’s
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 830 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2016),
rev’d on reh’g, 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
153. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 343–44.
157. See supra note 2; see also Hively, 853 F.3d at 353–54 (Posner, J.,
concurring) (rejecting the “diehard ‘originalist’” approach “that what was believed
[when Title VII was enacted] in 1964 defines the scope of the statute for as long
as the statutory text remains unchanged, and therefore until changed by
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failed attempts to amend Title VII in this manner.158 The
court noted, for example, that because the EEOC had
recently ruled that Title VII’s prohibition against sex
discrimination indeed encompasses discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation, this “may have caused some in
Congress to think that legislation is needed to carve sexual
orientation out of the statute, not to put it in.”159 According
to the court, this ruling, along with various decisions of the
Supreme Court shedding new light on Title VII’s existing
prohibition of “sex discrimination” (including those deeming
gender stereotyping a form of sex discrimination160), simply
made it impossible to determine what inference to draw from
congressional inaction on the subject.161
Rather than rely on Congress’s failure to amend Title
VII, the court chose instead to focus on “the [actual]
provisions of the law that are on the books,”162 in particular,
the aspect of Title VII prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of “sex,” as that term has been interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court.163 Here, the court stated that when
Congress enacted Title VII in 1964, it “may not have realized
or understood the full scope of the words it chose.” 164 This
would not limit the court, however, given the notion that
“statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil”
Congress’s amending or replacing the statute”).
158. Hively, 853 F.3d at 344 (majority opinion).
159. Id. at 344 (citing Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015
WL 4397641 (July 15, 2015)).
160. Id. at 342. Here, the court seemingly had in mind cases like Price
Waterhouse, which held that the practice of gender stereotyping falls within Title
VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination. See id.
161. Id. at 344.
162. Id. at 345.
163. See id. at 347 (describing “the interpretative question raised by Hively’s
case” as follows: “is sexual-orientation discrimination a form of sex
discrimination, given the way in which the Supreme Court has interpreted the
word ‘sex’ in the statute?”).
164. Id. at 345.
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that prompted a statute’s enactment “to cover reasonably
comparable evils.”165 The court noted that Title VII, in
particular “has been understood to cover far more than the
simple decision of an employer not to hire a woman for Job
A, or a man for Job B.”166 The Supreme Court has held, for
example, that Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination
reaches sexual harassment in the workplace,167 including
same-sex workplace harassment,168 even though such claims
were not recognized for many years after Title VII was
enacted.169 Along these lines, Title VII has been held to reach
discrimination based on “actuarial assumptions about a
person’s longevity,”170 as well as discrimination based on
gender non-conforming behavior.171 As the court declared,
“[i]t is quite possible that these interpretations may . . . have
surprised” the legislatures who enacted Title VII;
“[n]evertheless, experience with the law has led the Supreme
Court to recognize that each of these examples is a covered
form of sex discrimination.”172
Having determined that courts may legitimately extend
Title VII to forms of sex discrimination not envisioned when
the statute was enacted (a point disputed by the Hively
165. Id. at 344–45 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S.
75, 79–80 (1998)).
166. Id. at 345.
167. Id. (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
168. Id. (citing Oncale, 523 U.S. 75).
169. As the Hively court noted, the Supreme Court first held that Title VII’s
prohibition against sex discrimination extends to sexual harassment in the
workplace in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345. This was over
twenty years after Title VII was enacted. See also Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,
883 F.3d 100, 114 (2d Cir. 2018) (discussing that it was “not necessarily obvious”
to courts, in the years following Title VII’s enactment, that its prohibition of “sex”
discrimination would apply to sexual harassment claims).
170. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (citing City of Los Angeles, Dep’t of Water & Power
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)).
171. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
172. Id.
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dissent173), the court then provided three primary bases for
extending Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to
sexual orientation discrimination claims: the first based on
the comparative method of analyzing employment
discrimination claims, the second employing the
associational theory of employment discrimination, and the
third based on cases more generally protecting the right to
associate intimately with persons of the same sex.174 As
explained below, aspects of sex-plus discrimination can be
seen throughout the first two rationales outlined above.
Beginning with the “tried-and-true comparative method”
of analysis, the court declared that “[i]t is critical, in applying
the comparative method, to be sure that only the variable of
the plaintiff’s sex is allowed change.”175 Applying what is in
effect sex-plus analysis, the court then explained that the
issue “is not whether a lesbian is being treated better or
worse than gay men, bisexuals, or transsexuals, because
such a comparison shifts too many pieces at once”; rather,
“the counterfactual we must use is a situation in which
Hively is a man, but everything else stays the same: in
particular, the sex or gender of the partner.”176
Rephrased in sex-plus terms, in delineating the proper
comparator for Hively’s sexual orientation discrimination

173. Id. at 360 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“When a statute supplies the rule of
decision, our role is to give effect to the enacted text, interpreting the statutory
language as a reasonable person would have understood it at the time of
enactment. We are not authorized to infuse the text with a new or unconventional
meaning or to update it to respond to changed social, economic, or political
conditions.”) (emphasis added).
174. See id. at 345–52 (majority opinion).
175. Id. at 345.
176. Id.; see also id. at 347 (“The dissent criticizes us for not trying to rule out
sexual-orientation discrimination by controlling for it in our comparator
example. . . . [But] [i]t makes no sense to control for or rule out discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation if the question before us is whether that type of
discrimination is nothing more or less than a form of sex discrimination.”)
(emphasis in original).
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claim, the court essentially identified the key variables as
the plaintiff’s and comparator’s gender (female and male,
respectively), along with a “plus” factor of attraction to a
female, as opposed to attraction to members of the same
sex.177 By holding constant “the sex or gender of the partner”
(female), as opposed to the homosexuality or bisexuality of
the plaintiff, a ruling for Hively becomes almost
inevitable.178 Indeed, immediately following this statement,
the court declared:
Hively alleges that if she had been a man married to a woman (or
living with a woman, or dating a woman) and everything else had
stayed the same, Ivy Tech would not have refused to promote her
and would not have fired her. [Assuming these allegations are true],
[t]his describes paradigmatic sex discrimination. 179

When viewed through a sex-plus lens, the particular
“plus” factor identified as relevant is critical. Indeed, under
the alternative formulation endorsed by the dissent, which
in sex-plus terms contemplates a “plus” factor of attraction to
members of the same sex,180 a plaintiff like Hively might find
it more difficult to prove sex discrimination under the
comparative method, given that an employer who allegedly
discriminates against female homosexuals is likely to treat
male homosexuals no differently.181 As the Hively dissent
177. See id. at 345.
178. Id.
179. Id.; see also Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 119 (2d Cir.
2018) (describing the issue similarly, and concluding, “In the context of sexual
orientation, a woman who is subject to an adverse employment action because
she is attracted to women would have been treated differently if she had been a
man who was attracted to women. We can therefore conclude that sexual
orientation is a function of sex and, by extension, sexual orientation
discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination.”).
180. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 365 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring) (stating that when Title VII was
enacted in 1964, the statute’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination would have only
applied in the event a lesbian employee were fired but a homosexual man was
not, “for in that event the only difference between the two would be the gender of
the one [who was] fired”).
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explained:
[T]he proper comparison is to ask how Ivy Tech treated qualified
gay men. If an employer is willing to hire gay men but not lesbians,
then the comparative method has exposed an actual case of sex
discrimination. If, on the other hand, an employer . . . rejects all
homosexual applicants, then no inference of sex discrimination is
possible. . . .182

Considered in light of sex-plus theory, the dissent’s
articulation of the discrimination issue differs in respect to
the “plus” factor identified as relevant. In effect, the “plus”
factor identified by the majority is attraction to females,
whereas the “plus” factor identified by the dissent is
attraction to members of the same sex. This change in focus,
although subtle, allowed the dissent to reach the opposite
conclusion in regards to whether sexual orientation
discrimination
constitutes
sex
discrimination.183
Nevertheless, it is the wrong approach, particularly at the
motion-to-dismiss stage presented in Hively, given that
Hively herself did not allege that her employer discriminated
against women with same-sex attraction but not men with
same-sex attraction.184 As explained more fully in the next
section, the majority’s approach is also more consistent with
sex-plus discrimination precedents because it more clearly
exposes an employer’s animus against plaintiffs like Hively
and reveals discrimination against a particular subgroup of
female employees, precisely what the sex-plus doctrine is
designed to do.185
Returning to the majority’s analysis of Hively’s sexual

182. Id. at 366–67 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
183. Id.
184. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 117 (explaining the flaw in this argument).
185. See Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118
(2d Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he term ‘sex plus’ . . . is simply a
heuristic . . . developed in the context of Title VII to affirm that plaintiffs can
[claim sex discrimination] even when not all members of a disfavored class are
discriminated against”).
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orientation discrimination claim, the court next analogized
Hively’s claim to those based on gender non-conformity or
gender stereotypes.186 Again, the court’s analysis here
reflects sex-plus discrimination theory. The court noted, for
example, that in 1971 the Supreme Court ruled in Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp. that “Title VII does not permit an
employer to refuse to hire women with pre-school-age
children, but not men.”187 Likewise, the court noted its own
ruling in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., striking down a
rule requiring only female employees to be unmarried.188
As explained above, Phillips and Sprogis are each classic
examples of sex-plus discrimination, as those cases involve
an employer discriminating against a subset of females on
the basis of sex (gender) plus another characteristic
connected to a fundamental right (having young children, or
being married).189 This point was not lost on the Hively court,
as immediately after citing Sprogis the court declared:
In both [Phillips and Sprogis], the employer’s rule did not affect
every woman in the workforce. Just so here: a policy that
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation does not affect every
woman, or every man, but it is based on assumptions about the
proper behavior for someone of a given sex. . . . Any . . . job decision
based on the fact that the complainant—woman or man—dresses
differently, speaks differently, or dates or marries a same-sex
partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on sex. That
means that it falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex
discrimination . . . .190

Next, the court turned to the associational theory of
discrimination, which through a series of judicial rulings
recognizes that “a person who is discriminated against

186. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346.
187. Id. (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)).
188. Id. (citing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.
1971)).
189. See supra Part II.A.
190. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346–47.
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because of the protected characteristic of one with whom she
associates is actually being disadvantaged because of her
own traits.”191 Applying this theory, the court explained that
there is no meaningful difference between discrimination
based upon interracial association, which courts routinely
reject as a form of race discrimination, and claims alleging
discrimination on the basis of the sex with whom a person
associates, which should also be unlawful.192
Here again, the court’s analysis reflects sex-plus theory.
For example, examining cases finding Title VII violated by
discriminatory treatment based on an employee’s association
with a person of another race, the court explained that
“[c]hanging the race of one partner made a difference in
determining the legality of the [employer’s] conduct” in those
cases, such that those cases “rested on ‘distinctions drawn
according to race.’”193 The same scenario is present here, the
court explained, because “[i]f we were to change the sex of
one partner in a lesbian relationship, the outcome would be
different.”194 As the EEOC has so eloquently explained,
sexual orientation discrimination is “sex” discrimination
because “an employee alleging discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation is alleging that his or her employer took
his or her sex into account by treating him or her differently
for associating with a person of the same sex.”195 Thus, the
EEOC noted, “a gay man who alleges that his employer took
an adverse employment action against him because he
associated with or dated men states a claim of sex
discrimination under Title VII; the fact that the employee is
a man instead of a woman motivated the employer’s

191. See id. at 347–48 (summarizing cases applying the associational theory).
192. See id. at 348.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 349.
195. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6
(July 15, 2015) (emphasis in original).
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discrimination against him.”196
In sex-plus terms, the associational theory of
discrimination, as applied in the sexual orientation
discrimination context, simply recognizes that it is the
plaintiff’s sex (e.g., female) combined with the sex of her
partner (e.g., female) that drives the employer’s
discriminatory action. In the Hively court’s words, such
discriminatory animus disappears “[i]f we were to change the
sex of one partner” in such a relationship, such as by
considering how an employer treats a male comparator with
a female partner.197 This is precisely the type of scenario sexplus theory is designed to cover (where the plus factor
consists of having a female partner).198
In the final section of its opinion, the Hively court
reviewed a line of Supreme Court decisions protecting the
right to associate intimately with people of the same sex.199
Although many of these decisions extend beyond the
employment context, they are important, according to the
court, given its task of “consider[ing] what the correct rule of
law is now in light of the Supreme Court’s authoritative
interpretations, not what someone thought it meant one, ten,
or twenty years ago.”200
Here, the court referenced two employment
discrimination cases, Price Waterhouse (holding that gender
stereotyping falls within Title VII’s prohibition of sex
discrimination) and Oncale (holding male-on-male sexual
harassment actionable).201 The court also cited numerous
cases beyond the employment context, including Romer v.
196. Id.
197. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.
198. See infra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
199. See Hively, 853 F.3d at 349–50.
200. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 342, 349 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989);
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)).
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Evans, in which the Supreme Court found the federal Equal
Protection Clause violated by the Colorado Constitution’s
provision forbidding any state governmental organ from
taking action designed to protect “homosexual, lesbian, or
bisexual” persons;202 Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Court
struck down a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual
intimacy between consenting adults as a violation of the
liberty provision of the Due Process Clause;203 United States
v. Windsor, which found due process and equal protection
violations in the Defense of Marriage Act’s exclusion of a
same-sex partner from the definition of “spouse” in other
federal statutes;204 and Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck
down restrictions on the right of same-sex couples to marry
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.205 After summarizing these cases,
the court concluded that “the time has come” to recognize
sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII.206 Accordingly, the court
ended its opinion similar to how it began by again
emphasizing the judiciary’s role in expanding Title VII’s
protections to appropriately modernize the statute,207 a task
that sex-plus discrimination theory is well-equipped to
perform.
In the second of four opinions in the case, Judge Richard
Posner wrote a concurrence agreeing with the majority while
suggesting “an alternative approach that may be more

202. Id. at 349 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996)).
203. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
204. Id. (citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769 (2013)).
205. Id. at 349–50 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)).
206. Id. at 350–51.
207. See id; see also id. at 343 (stating that the issue of statutory interpretation
before the court is “well within the judiciary’s competence”); id. at 345
(summarizing the lesson of Oncale as follows: “the fact that the enacting Congress
may not have anticipated a particular application of the law cannot stand in the
way of the provisions of the law that are on the books”).
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straightforward.”208 Similar to the majority, Judge Posner
first articulated the method of statutory interpretation he
found “most clearly applicable in the present case.”209 This
particular method goes beyond the original meaning of a
statute, he explained, and involves “giving a fresh meaning
to a [statutory or constitutional] statement . . . that infuses
the statement with vitality and significance today,” thereby
“making
old
law
satisfy
modern
needs
and
understandings.”210 Judge Posner noted that Title VII in
particular is now more than 50 years old, and “invites an
interpretation that will update it to the present, a present
that differs markedly from the era in which the Act was
enacted.”211
In an important passage for sex-plus theory, Judge
Posner then noted that when Title VII was enacted in 1964,
the statute’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination would have
only applied in the event a lesbian employee were fired but a
homosexual man was not, “for in that event the only
difference between the two would be the gender of the one
[who was] fired.”212 He also noted that Title VII does not
explicitly outlaw sexual orientation discrimination, adding
further that Title VII’s framers likely did not have
homosexuality in mind at the time the statute was
enacted,213 such that “an explanation is needed for how 53
years later the meaning of the statute has changed and the
word ‘sex’ now connotes both gender and sexual
orientation.”214
Judge Posner provided that “explanation” by again
208. Id. at 352 (Posner, J., concurring).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 353.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. (emphasis in original).
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reiterating his expansive view of the judiciary’s role in
interpreting statutes and constitutional provisions.215 He
wrote, for example, that “statutory and constitutional
provisions frequently are interpreted on the basis of present
need and understanding rather than original meaning,” and
cited numerous case examples adopting that approach.216
This assertion then led Judge Posner to perhaps the most
controversial statement across the range of Hively opinions,
in which he stated that, rather than merely interpreting Title
VII in light of changing times, the Hively court is instead
“rewriting” the statute to give it “a new, a broader
meaning,”217 one which the Congress that enacted Title VII
“would not have accepted.”218
From there, Judge Posner then turned to the task of
defending his interpretation of the word “sex” as
encompassing both gender and sexual orientation.219 The
rationale offered by Judge Posner to justify this “admittedly
loose” interpretation of sex discrimination220 largely rests on
sex-plus theory. In one passage, for example, Judge Posner
explained that because sexual orientation is innate, rather
than chosen, discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation should be unlawful.221 He wrote:
The position of a woman discriminated against on account of being
a lesbian is thus analogous to a woman’s being discriminated
against on account of being a woman. That woman didn’t choose to
be a woman; the lesbian didn’t choose to be a lesbian. I don’t see

215. Id. at 353–54.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 354; see also id. at 357 (“I . . . acknowledge openly that today we,
who are judges rather than members of Congress, are imposing on a half-centuryold statute a meaning of ‘sex discrimination’ that the Congress that enacted it
would not have accepted. This is something courts do fairly frequently . . . .”).
218. Id. at 357.
219. See id. at 354–56.
220. Id. at 355.
221. Id. at 354–55.
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why firing a lesbian because she is in the subset of women who are
lesbian should be thought any less a form of sex discrimination than
firing a woman because she’s a woman. 222

Recall
that
the
sex-plus
doctrine
prohibits
discrimination against a subset of male or female employees
based on either the exercise of a fundamental right or an
immutable characteristic, one the employee cannot
change.223 Although Judge Posner’s analysis, quoted above,
does not explicitly reference sex-plus discrimination
doctrine, his reasoning echoes the theory. Judge Posner
states, for example, that “the lesbian didn’t choose to be a
lesbian,”224 indicating that, in his view, sexual preferences
are immutable.225 He also “do[es]n’t see why firing a lesbian
because she is in the subset of women who are lesbian should
be thought any less a form of sex discrimination than firing
a woman because she’s a woman.”226 Neither does sex-plus
theory, given that the subset of women comprised of lesbians
would involve “plus” factors of immutable characteristics or
fundamental rights, a point developed more fully in the
section to follow.227
In another striking passage reminiscent of sex-plus
theory, Judge Posner ratified the majority’s statement that
“Ivy Tech is disadvantaging [Hively] because she is a
woman,” not a man, who prefers female partners.228 He then
wrote: “That’s a different type of sex discrimination from the

222. Id.
223. See supra Part II.
224. Hively, 853 F.3d at 355.
225. See id. at 354 (citing Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014))
(explaining that the Seventh Circuit, in 2014, examined whether homosexual
orientation is innate or chosen, and determined that “the scientific literature
strongly supports the proposition that it is biological and innate, not a choice like
deciding how to dress”).
226. Id. at 355.
227. See infra notes 286, 290 and accompanying text.
228. Hively, 853 F.3d at 356 (emphasis in original).
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classic cases of old in which women were erroneously
(sometimes maliciously) deemed unqualified for certain jobs”
simply because they were women.229
Judge Posner is correct. In sex-plus terms, the “different
type of sex discrimination” to which he refers is, in fact,
discrimination on the basis of sex plus a certain sexual
preference, i.e., for female partners. As Judge Posner notes,
this is indeed different from classic cases of pure gender
discrimination,
but
it
is
gender
discrimination
230
nonetheless.
Hively’s closest analog to sex-plus theory is contained in
the third opinion in the case, a concurring opinion written by
Judge Joel Flaum and joined by Judge Kenneth Ripple. 231
Similar to the previous two opinions, Judge Flaum described
the issue as whether “discrimination based on Professor
Hively’s ‘sexual orientation’ constitute[s] discrimination
based on her ‘sex’” under Title VII.232 Judge Flaum concluded
that it does.233
To establish the necessary connection to Hively’s
gender,234 Judge Flaum reiterated Hively’s argument that
Ivy Tech “relied on her sex, because, but for her sex, she
would not have been denied a promotion (i.e., she would not

229. Id.
230. See Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118
(2d Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he term ‘sex plus’ . . . is simply a
heuristic . . . developed in the context of Title VII to affirm that plaintiffs can
[claim sex discrimination] even when not all members of a disfavored class are
discriminated against”).
231. Hively, 853 F.3d at 357–59 (Flaum, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 357 (“I find the issue before us is simply whether discriminating
against an employee for being homosexual violates Title VII’s prohibition against
discriminating against that employee because of their sex”).
233. Id.
234. See id. at 358 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989), for the proposition that an employee alleging sex discrimination “must
show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision.”).

2019] SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION

1051

have been denied a promotion if she were a man who was
sexually attracted to women).”235 From there, the judge
declared, “[t]here is no allegation [in Hively’s case] that the
College refused to promote women; nor is there an allegation
that it refused to promote those who associate with
women.”236 Rather, the judge declared, “Ivy Tech’s alleged
animus was against Professor Hively’s sexual orientation—
a combination of these two factors.”237
Having stated Hively’s argument in this manner—one
that is nothing more than a claim of sex-plus discrimination
based on the combination of both Hively’s gender and her
association with women—Judge Flaum declared that
“discrimination against an employee on the basis of their
homosexuality is necessarily, in part, discrimination based
on their sex.”238 As Judge Flaum explained, homosexuality is
marked by attraction to individuals of the “same sex.”239
Accordingly, “[o]ne cannot consider a person’s homosexuality
without also accounting for their sex: doing so would render
‘same’ [sex] meaningless.”240 As such, the judge explained,
“discriminating against that employee because they are
homosexual constitutes discriminating against an employee
because of (A) the employee’s sex, and (B) their sexual
attraction to individuals of the same sex. And ‘sex,’ under
Title VII, is an enumerated trait.”241 Finally, the judge noted,
Title VII requires a plaintiff like Hively to prove only that
her sex was “a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. (emphasis in original).
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practice.”242 Accordingly, unlawful “sex” discrimination
occurs when an employer discriminates against an employee
because they are homosexual.243
Judge Flaum’s analysis most closely resembles sex-plus
discrimination theory, in that it explicitly recognizes that
Hively’s claim is based upon “a combination” of both her
gender and her attraction to women, which together
produced the “alleged animus” for which she complained.244
Although Judge Flaum did not mention the sex-plus theory
in his analysis, the sex-plus doctrine is implicit within it.245
As such, the sex-plus theory appears to be a viable argument
for litigants to present in cases similar to Hively’s.
B. Second Circuit Court of Appeals
In Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,246 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit joined the Seventh
Circuit in extending Title VII’s prohibition of “sex”
discrimination
to
claims
of
sexual
orientation
247
discrimination. Although the Zarda court’s analysis is less
obviously related to sex-plus theory, the opinion is
undoubtedly significant, and employs a strikingly similar
structure to the majority opinion in Hively.

242. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)).
243. See id. at 359 (“[I]f discriminating against an employee because she is
homosexual is equivalent to discriminating against her because she is (A) a
woman who is (B) sexually attracted to women, then it is motivated, in part, by
an enumerated trait: the employee’s sex. That is all an employee must show to
successfully allege a Title VII claim.”).
244. See id. at 358.
245. See, e.g., id. at 359 (“Ivy Tech allegedly refused to promote Professor
Hively because she was homosexual—or (A) a woman who is (B) sexually
attracted to women. Thus, the College allegedly discriminated against Professor
Hively, at least in part, because of her sex. . . . Title VII, as its text provides, does
not allow this.”).
246. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
247. Id. at 107–08.
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Similar to the Hively majority, the en banc court in
Zarda began its analysis of Zarda’s sexual orientation
discrimination claim by emphasizing its task of simply
interpreting Title VII’s existing prohibition of “sex”
discrimination, as that text has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court.248 Also similar to Hively, the Zarda court
declared that Title VII’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination
should be interpreted broadly,249 consistent with the
Supreme Court’s view that Title VII covers not just “the
principal evil” that led to Title VII’s enactment, but also
“reasonably comparable evils” that meet the statutory
requirements.250 Finally, the court stated that “the critical
inquiry” in a Title VII sex discrimination claim is to
determine whether the plaintiff’s sex was “a motivating
factor” in the employer’s decision.251 As such, the court
described the issue as “whether an employee’s sex is
necessarily a motivating factor in discrimination based on
sexual orientation,” so as to make sexual orientation
discrimination claims a subset of sex discrimination
claims.252 And on that issue, the court agreed with Hively
that “sexual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least

248. Id. at 111–12 (“In deciding whether Title VII prohibits sexual orientation
discrimination, we are guided, as always, by the text and, in particular, by the
phrase ‘because of . . . sex.’ However, in interpreting this language, we do not
write on a blank slate. Instead, we must construe the text in light of the entirety
of the statute as well as relevant precedent.”); cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 347
(describing “the interpretative question raised by Hively’s case” as follows: “is
sexual-orientation discrimination a form of sex discrimination, given the way in
which the Supreme Court has interpreted the word ‘sex’ in the statute?”).
249. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 111.
250. Id. at 112 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
79 (1998)); cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 344–45.
251. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)); cf. Hively, 853
F.3d at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring) (also highlighting the “motivating factor”
standard in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)).
252. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112; cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 343 (describing the issue in
that case as “whether actions taken on the basis of sexual orientation are a subset
of actions taken on the basis of sex”).
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in part, by sex and is thus a subset of sex discrimination.”253
Similar to Hively, and borrowing as well from the
EEOC’s reasoning in Baldwin, the Zarda court then
provided three primary reasons for extending Title VII’s
prohibition of “sex” discrimination to claims of sexual
orientation discrimination: the first based on the plain text
of Title VII, including the comparative method of analyzing
employment discrimination claims; the second based on
gender stereotyping precedents; and the third employing the
associational theory of discrimination.254
From the perspective of sex-plus discrimination analysis,
the Zarda court’s first articulated rationale is most
significant. The court began this particular analysis by
declaring that “sex is necessarily a factor in sexual
orientation.”255 “Sexual orientation,” the court explained,
refers to “a person’s predisposition or inclination toward
sexual activity or behavior with other males or
females,” and is commonly characterized as heterosexuality,
homosexuality, or bisexuality.256 Homosexuality, for
example, is “characterized by sexual desire for a person of
the same sex.”257 Accordingly, to identify a person’s sexual
orientation, one must know both “the sex of the person and
that of the people to whom he or she is attracted.”258 For this
reason, the court explained, “sexual orientation is a function
of sex,” and is in fact “doubly delineated by sex because it is
a function of both a person’s sex and the sex of those to whom
253. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112; cf. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345 (describing Hively’s
claim as “paradigmatic sex discrimination”).
254. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112–13; cf. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No.
0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5–8 (July 15, 2015) (presenting similar
rationales).
255. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 112.
256. Id. at 113 (quoting Sexual Orientation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014)).
257. Id. (quoting Homosexual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
258. Id.
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he or she is attracted.”259 Finally, the court declared,
“because sexual orientation is a function of sex and sex is a
protected characteristic under Title VII, it follows that
sexual orientation is also protected.”260
Although the hints of sex-plus discrimination are more
subtle than in Hively, the sex-plus doctrine is nevertheless
reflected in the Zarda court’s analysis above. As the court
explained, a person’s “sexual orientation” is “doubly
delineated by sex because it is a function of both a person’s
sex and the sex of those to whom he or she is attracted.”261
Accordingly, discriminating against a gay male because of
his sexual orientation is equivalent to discriminating against
him because of (A) his own sex, male; and (B) his attraction
to males.262 From a male plaintiff’s perspective, this
combination of factors describes an instance of sex-plus
discrimination involving a plus factor—attraction to males—
consisting of an immutable characteristic. And as the Hively
court declared, if one “were to change the sex of one partner
in a [homosexual] relationship”—here, by considering a
female comparator who is likewise attracted to males—the
result would be different.263 Or, as the EEOC artfully
explained: if an employer suspends a lesbian employee for
displaying a photo of her female spouse on her desk, but does
not suspend a male employee for displaying a photo of his
female spouse on his desk, that action necessarily entails
treating the female employee less favorably because of her
sex, because “but for” that characteristic, her suspension
would not have occurred.264 Although in this passage the

259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See id. (quoting Hively, 853 F.3d at 358 (Flaum, J., concurring)).
263. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.
264. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5
(July 15, 2015) (citing Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 711 (1978)).
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EEOC purports to describe an instance of pure sex
discrimination, the plus factor at issue—having a female
spouse—is central to the analysis. Moreover, the claim here
would not be that the employer is discriminating against
females as a whole, but rather only against the particular
subset of females with female partners. Sex-plus theory is
tailor-made for those circumstances.
V. HOW SEX-PLUS THEORY AUTHORIZES TITLE VII SEXUAL
ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
By this point, it should be obvious that sexual orientation
discrimination is a form of sex-plus discrimination, such that
no amendment to Title VII is needed for courts to apply the
statute in that manner. A comparison to Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.265 further reveals how sex-plus theory
exposes sexual orientation discrimination claims as a subset
of sex discrimination claims.
In Phillips, the Court found an employer liable for sex
discrimination due to its policy of refusing to hire women, but
not men, with pre-school aged children.266 As the Phillips
Court succinctly declared, Title VII “requires that persons of
like qualifications be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex,” a principle violated by the
employer’s gender-based hiring policies.267
In Phillips, the plaintiff belonged to a subgroup of
women consisting of women with pre-school aged children;
the comparator group, treated more favorably by the
employer, consisted of men with pre-school aged children.268
In that context, a female applicant’s sex and the “plus” factor
of having young children combined to produce the employer’s
specific discriminatory animus, leading to gender-based

265. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
266. Id. at 544.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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differences in hiring. Accordingly, if one were to change
either of those variables—by considering either a male
applicant with young children or a female applicant without
young children—the employer’s specific discriminatory
animus would disappear.
This is also the case with sexual orientation
discrimination. Take, for example, a lesbian plaintiff who
experiences a hostile work environment and is eventually
fired due to her employer’s anti-gay bias. Under a sex-plus
analysis, the plaintiff’s relevant subgroup of women would be
those attracted to other women; the comparator group,
treated more favorably by the employer, would consist of men
who share the same plus factor, attraction to women. Finally,
just as in Phillips, the lesbian plaintiff’s sex (female) would
combine with the plus factor (attraction to women) to
generate the employer’s specific discriminatory animus. If
one were to change either of those two variables—by
considering either a male employee attracted to females or a
female employee attracted to males—the employer’s
discriminatory animus disappears. Thus, just as in Phillips,
the plaintiff’s sex is necessarily a motivating factor in the
employer’s decision, which is all that Title VII requires.269
In the example of a sex-plus discrimination claim
brought by a lesbian plaintiff, the plus characteristic that
matters is the fact of being attracted to females, as it is this
particular plus factor that triggers the employer’s
discriminatory animus. This, in turn, makes the relevant
comparator subgroup men who are likewise attracted to
females. From there, it would ordinarily be easy for a lesbian
plaintiff possessing evidence of sexual orientation
discrimination to prove a difference in treatment between
females who are attracted to females, as compared to males

269. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); see also Franchina v. City of
Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 53 (noting that Title VII’s text “bars discrimination
when sex is ‘a motivating factor,’ not ‘the motivating factor’”).
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attracted to females, thereby establishing an instance of sexplus discrimination.270 As such, the only question remaining
is whether the relevant plus factor, sexual attraction,
involves an immutable characteristic or a fundamental right,
either of which sex-plus theory typically requires.271
A. Intimate Association as a Fundamental Right
There is no doubt that a person’s intimate association
with another implicates fundamental rights. This much the
Supreme Court made clear in Obergefell v. Hodges,272 as well
as the cases leading up to it.
In Obergefell, the Court considered whether the
Fourteenth Amendment was violated by state statutes that
either denied same-sex couples the right to marry or denied
recognition to lawful same-sex marriages performed in
another state.273 The Court analyzed these issues primarily
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
which declares that “no State shall ‘deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”274 The
“fundamental rights” protected by this Clause, the Court
noted, include “interests of the person so fundamental that
the State must accord them its respect,”275 and consist of
270. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (finding that a policy of refusing to hire
women with pre-school age children discriminates on the basis of sex where there
was no similar policy for men with such children).
271. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir.
1975); cf. Valdes v. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., (The Kemper Grp.), 507 F. Supp.
10, 12 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (recognizing that “[i]f one’s sexual preference is such a
‘fundamental right’ or ‘immutable’ characteristic, it would seem that an employer
may not discriminate between male and female homosexuals,” but determining
that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had seemingly “adopted a different
approach” in a case concluding that discrimination against “effeminate” males
does not constitute sex discrimination).
272. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
273. Id. at 2593.
274. Id. at 2597 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV).
275. Id. at 2598.
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“certain personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal
identity and beliefs.”276 Marriage, the Court declared, is
among those liberties, such that “the right to marry is
fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”277 Examining
whether the right to marry encompasses same-sex marriage,
the Court then noted that although its previous cases
“presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners,”
the rationales underlying those cases apply with equal force
to same-sex couples, which “compels the conclusion that
same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”278
Accordingly, the Court held that same-sex couples may not
be deprived of the fundamental right to marry.279
Although Obergefell contains a lengthy discussion of the
fundamental nature of marriage,280 prior to Obergefell the
Court had been moving towards recognizing intimate
association as a fundamental right, both for opposite-sex and
same-sex couples.281 In 1996, for example, the Court
in Romer v. Evans invalidated an amendment to Colorado’s
Constitution that sought to foreclose any branch or political
subdivision of the State from protecting persons against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.282 Then, in 2003,

276. Id. at 2597.
277. Id. at 2598 (“Over time and in other contexts, the Court has reiterated
that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause.”); see also
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (describing the right to marry as a
“fundamental freedom” and stating that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men”).
278. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598–99 (“[T]he reasons marriage is fundamental
under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”).
279. Id. at 2604–05 (“The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise
the fundamental right to marry.”).
280. See id. at 2598–2602.
281. See id. at 2596–2600 (summarizing these and other cases).
282. 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996); see also Gregory M. Herek et al., Demographic,
Psychological, and Social Characteristics of Self–Identified Lesbian, Gay, and
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the Court in Lawrence v. Texas invalidated laws that made
same-sex intimacy a criminal act.283 The Obergefell Court
later described Lawrence as holding that “same-sex couples
have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate
association,”284 providing support for the notion that
intimate association with a person of the same sex, even in
the absence of marriage, can be linked to a fundamental
right.285 Once this is established, a plus factor involving an
employee’s intimate association with a person of the same
sex would trigger the sex-plus doctrine.286
B. Sexual Attraction as Immutable
Even assuming there is no fundamental right to
intimately associate with a person of the same sex, a
plaintiff-employee’s sexual attraction to a person of the same
sex could, at least for many plaintiffs, be considered
immutable.
In Baskin v. Bogan, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
discussed at length whether homosexual orientation is
innate or chosen, and found that the scientific literature
Bisexual Adults in a U.S. Probability Sample, 7 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 176,
177 (2010) (stating that “sexual orientation is a multifaceted construct that
encompasses sexual attraction, sexual behavior, personal identity, romantic
relationships, and community membership.”).
283. 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
284. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2604
(stating that “[a]lthough Lawrence elaborated its holding under the Due Process
Clause, it acknowledged, and sought to remedy, the continuing inequality that
resulted from laws making intimacy in the lives of gays and lesbians a crime”).
285. See id. at 2600 (“[W]hile Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom that
allows individuals to engage in intimate association without criminal liability, it
does not follow that freedom stops there. Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward,
but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty.”); id. at 2602 (describing “the
approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including
marriage and intimacy” (emphasis added)).
286. See Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir.
1975) (“[A]n employer cannot have one hiring policy for men and another for
women if the distinction is based on some fundamental right.”).
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strongly supports the proposition that it is biological and
innate, rather than a choice.287 As Judge Posner later
explained in Hively, this finding is important because it
makes “[t]he position of a woman discriminated against on
account of being a lesbian . . . analogous to a woman’s being
discriminated against on account of being a woman.”288 As
Judge Posner declared, just like a woman does not choose to
be a woman, “the lesbian didn’t choose to be a lesbian.”289
Accordingly, “firing a lesbian because she is in the subset of
women who are lesbian [is no] less a form of sex
discrimination than firing a woman because she’s a
woman.”290
As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, scientific
literature supports the proposition that homosexual
orientation is biological and innate, making it an immutable
characteristic similar to one’s race or national origin.291 Such
evidence could help build the case for treating sexual
orientation discrimination as a form of unlawful sex-plus
discrimination.
In a study examining this issue, researchers Gregory M.
Herek, Aaron T. Norton, Thomas J. Allen, and Charles L.
Sims, examined data from a U.S. national probability sample
consisting of 662 self-identified lesbian, gay, and bisexual

287. 766 F.3d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding “little doubt that sexual
orientation . . . is an immutable (and probably an innate, in the sense of in-born)
characteristic rather than a choice.”); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (citing
Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae 7–17) (“Only
in more recent years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual
orientation is both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable.”).
288. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 354–55 (7th Cir.
2017) (Posner, J., concurring).
289. Id. at 355.
290. Id.
291. See Baskin, 766 F.3d at 657; see also Hively, 853 F.3d at 363 (Sykes, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “sex” and “sexual orientation” are “different immutable
characteristic[s]”).
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adults,292 and determined that the vast majority of
respondents reported experiencing little or no choice about
their sexual orientation.293 In their study, perceived choice
about one’s sexual orientation was assessed with the
question, “How much choice do you feel you had about being
[L[esbian]/G[ay]/B[isexual]/Q[ueer]/H[omosexual]]?”294 The
response options were “no choice at all,” “a small amount of
choice,” “a fair amount of choice,” and “a great deal of
choice.”295 With 95% confidence intervals,296 the authors
reported that 60.6% of respondents reported having “no
choice at all,” 14.2% reported having “a small amount of
choice,” and 25.2% reported having either “a fair amount” or
“great deal of” choice in their specific sexual orientation.297
According to the authors, “[o]verall, respondents reported
that they did not experience their sexual orientation as a
choice,” but “[t]his pattern varied somewhat . . . according to
gender and sexual orientation.”298 For example, nearly nine
out of ten gay men (88%), and roughly two thirds of lesbians
(68%) reported having no choice at all about their sexual
orientation.299 In addition, “[c]ombining respondents who
said they’d had a small amount of choice with those reporting
no choice, 95% of gay men and 84% of lesbians could be
characterized as perceiving that they had little or no choice
292. Herek et al., supra note 282, at 176, 178; see also id. at 179–80 (describing
the sample).
293. Id. at 176.
294. Id. at 180. As the authors note, respondents were asked to indicate their
preferred term for characterizing their own sexual orientation (e.g., “Gay,”
“Lesbian,” “Bisexual,” “Queer,” “Homosexual”). This label was subsequently
inserted into questions that referred to the respondent’s sexual orientation or
identity. This individualized item wording is indicated throughout their article
as [L/G/B/Q/H]. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 181.
297. Id. at 186 (reporting results at Table 3).
298. Id. at 188.
299. Id.
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about their sexual orientation.”300 Reaching a similar
conclusion, the American Psychological Association has said
that “most people experience little or no sense of choice about
their sexual orientation.”301 Thus, although there will always
be those who believe homosexuality represents a willful
choice,302 those with that orientation often do not perceive it
that way.303
Beyond the argument that Congress, rather than courts,
should decide whether sexual orientation discrimination
should be outlawed under Title VII as a matter of public
policy,304 perhaps the biggest objection to the sex-plus
argument outlined in this Article is that it considers the
wrong plus factor, thereby failing to demonstrate
discrimination on the basis of sex. As the competing Hively
opinions demonstrate (albeit without actually examining the
issue from a sex-plus perspective), there are essentially two
ways to state the relevant plus factor in a case involving
alleged sexual orientation discrimination.
The first, plaintiff-friendly view, is to state the relevant
plus characteristic as attraction to members of the plaintiff’s
same sex. In the hypothetical scenario of a lesbian plaintiff,
the plus factor would thus become attraction to females.
From there, sex discrimination can be revealed by holding
constant that particular plus factor (i.e., attraction to
females) and examining whether there is evidence of
differential treatment between the plaintiff and males who

300. Id.
301. Answers to Your Questions: For a Better Understanding of Sexual
Orientation & Homosexuality, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/
topics/lgbt/orientation (last visited July 13, 2019) (under the heading “What
causes a person to have a particular sexual orientation?”).
302. See generally DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTIGAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND
(1997).

THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT

303. See Herek et al., supra note 282, at 195.
304. See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
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are likewise attracted to females.305
The alternative, employer-friendly view, is to state the
relevant plus characteristic as a particular sexual
orientation, here, homosexuality.306 In this respect, a lesbian
plaintiff like Hively might find it more difficult to prove the
requisite sex discrimination under Title VII, given that an
employer who allegedly discriminates against female
homosexuals would likely treat the relevant male
comparator sharing that particular plus factor, male
homosexuals, no differently.307
For a sex-plus discrimination claim brought by a lesbian
employee, however, the truly relevant comparator group of
the opposite gender is not gay males, as the Hively dissent
posits.308 Rather, it is males sharing the identical plus factor
that in fact triggers the employer’s animus against the
particular subset of women who are gay: attraction to
females.309 The Seventh Circuit addressed this very issue in
Hively, and rejected the dissent’s comparator of homosexual
males through an analogy to Loving, in which the Supreme
Court deemed unconstitutional certain state statutes
preventing marriages between persons on the basis of racial
305. See Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 358 (Flaum, J.,
concurring) (articulating the plaintiff’s argument as follows: “Professor Hively
argues that [in refusing to promote her] the College relied on her sex, because,
but for her sex, she would not have been denied a promotion (i.e., she would not
have been denied a promotion if she were a man who was sexually attracted to
women).”) (emphasis in original).
306. Id. at 345 (majority opinion).
307. See id. at 353 (Posner, J., concurring) (stating that when Title VII was
enacted in 1964, the statute’s prohibition of “sex” discrimination would have only
applied in the event a lesbian employee were fired but a homosexual man was
not, “for in that event the only difference between the two would be the gender of
the one [who was] fired.”).
308. See id. at 366 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
309. See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2018)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that a lesbian plaintiff alleging sexual
harassment under a sex-plus theory must present evidence of a comparative class
of gay males who were not discriminated against).
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classifications.310 The Hively court explained:
The dissent would instead have us compare the treatment of men
who are attracted to members of the male sex with the treatment of
women who are attracted to members of the female sex, and ask
whether an employer treats the men differently from the
women. . . . Loving shows why this fails. In the context of interracial
relationships, we could just as easily hold constant a variable such
as “sexual or romantic attraction to persons of a different race” and
ask whether an employer treated persons of different races who
shared that propensity the same. That is precisely the rule that
Loving rejected, and so too must we, in the context of sexual
associations. . . . No matter which [Title VII] category is involved,
the essence of the claim is that the plaintiff would not be suffering
the adverse action had his or her sex [or] race . . . been different.311

Because the Supreme Court in Loving effectively
rejected the defendant’s proposed comparator of a person of
a different race than the plaintiff who associates with
someone of a different race than the comparator, which is
analogous to that advocated by the Hively dissent (i.e., an
opposite-sex comparator who is attracted to members of the
comparator’s same sex), courts examining sexual orientation
discrimination claims under a sex-plus theory should
likewise reject the type of comparator advocated by the
Hively dissent.312
Aside from the analogy to Loving outlined above, even if
a court were to isolate an employer’s treatment of both
female and male homosexuals, this would not rule out the
possibility of discriminatory intent against a plaintiff like
Hively.313 After all, the comparative method is just one

310. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
311. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349 (majority opinion); see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 7–
8 (describing the State of Virginia’s argument in that case, which the Supreme
Court rejected).
312. Hively, 853 F.3d at 349.
313. Of course, there may be times where an employer harbors discriminatory
animus against female homosexuals but not male homosexuals. Where such
animus results in adverse employment actions against lesbians but not gay
males, gender discrimination has necessarily occurred. Hively, 853 F.3d at 366
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method of proving discrimination.314 Primarily used as an
evidentiary test,315 the comparative method is particularly
helpful when a plaintiff attempts to prove discrimination
through circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent.316
Where direct evidence of discriminatory intent exists,
however, the comparative method is unnecessary.317 For this
reason, courts upholding sex-plus discrimination claims have
often relied on other forms of evidence, beyond comparators,
to reveal the employer’s unique discriminatory animus.
In Lam,318 for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals relied on evidence that members of the
appointments committee in Lam’s case were particularly
biased against women and Asians.319 According to the Ninth
Circuit, this evidence was sufficient to preclude summary
judgment for the defendants on Lam’s sex-plus-race
discrimination claim.320 Likewise, in a
sex-plus
(Sykes, J., dissenting) (“If an employer is willing to hire gay men but not lesbians,
then the comparative method has exposed an actual case of sex discrimination.”).
314. See id. at 365–66 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (explaining how the comparative
method is often used as a method of proving that an employer acted with a
discriminatory motive in a given case).
315. See id.
316. See Bagwe v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 866, 879 (7th
Cir. 2016) (characterizing comparative evidence as circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent).
317. See id.; see also Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003)
(recognizing that a Title VII plaintiff may prove his case using either direct or
circumstantial evidence); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving
Discrimination by Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 204 (2009) (discussing the
use of comparator evidence in discrimination cases and stating that “the lower
courts have pretty clearly rejected comparator proof as necessary.”); see also, e.g.,
Mora v. Jackson Mem’l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding
alleged statement that plaintiff was “too old” to be direct evidence of age
discrimination); Van Voorhis v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 512 F.3d
1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008) (classifying an employer’s statement of not wanting
to hire “any old pilots” as direct evidence).
318. Lam v. Univ. of Hawai’i, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
319. Id. at 1560.
320. Id.
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discrimination claim involving a fundamental right, the
court in McGrenaghan ruled that a teacher could maintain a
Title VII sex discrimination claim as a member of a subclass
of women with disabled children based on evidence of
discriminatory animus specific to such women, including
direct evidence of discriminatory animus by the school’s
principal.321 And most importantly, given such evidence, the
McGrenaghan court did not consider whether the employer
harbored a similar animus against fathers with disabled
children.322
As Lam and McGrenaghan show, although comparator
evidence across genders could certainly help prove
discrimination based on sex where such evidence is
necessary to expose the employer’s discriminatory animus,
what matters most is whether a plaintiff like Hively can
prove her employer acted on the basis of a discriminatory
animus directed against her, in particular, because of her sex
in combination with an immutable characteristic or
fundamental right.323 The concurring judges in Hively
recognized this when they wrote: “The foregoing analysis
should obtain even if an employer allegedly discriminates
against all homosexual employees. In that case, the
employer’s discrimination across sexes does not demonstrate
that sex is irrelevant, but rather that each individual has a
plausible sex-based discrimination claim.”324 The majority in
Zarda made the same point when it noted that the employer
321. McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
322. See id. at 326–27 (denying summary judgment to the defendant-employer
without considering such comparative evidence).
323. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1559 (noting that “the existence of a discriminatory
motive for the employment decision will generally be the principal question” in
an employment discrimination case).
324. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 359 n.2 (7th Cir.
2017) (Flaum, J., concurring) (“When confronting claims that are inherently
based in part on sex, such as discrimination against homosexuals, each
employee’s claim satisfies Title VII on its face, no matter the sex of any other
employee who experienced discrimination.”).
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in Price Waterhouse could not have defended itself against
Hopkins’s gender non-conformity claim by arguing that it
fired a gender-non-conforming man as well as a gender-nonconforming woman.325 “To the contrary,” the court noted,
“this claim would merely be an admission that the employer
has doubly violated Title VII by using gender stereotypes to
discriminate against both men and women.”326 The same
result should apply when an employer discriminates against
all employees, male and female, based on stereotypes about
the gender to which the employees should be attracted, as
this is nothing more than “a double-edged sword that cuts
both men and women” the same.327 For these reasons and
others, numerous scholars agree that the comparative
method of proving employment discrimination has its
flaws.328
In sum, where a female plaintiff alleges sex
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the
relevant subclass of women consists of women who are
sexually attracted to other women. Under precedents like
Lam, McGrenaghan, Hively, and Zarda, if a plaintiff
presents evidence of discriminatory animus against her
particular subset of women, that is all the plaintiff must
show. This point was made explicit in a 2018 First Circuit
325. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 123 (2d Cir. 2018).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE
L.J. 728, 731 (2011) (arguing that “the most traditional and widely used
heuristic—comparators, who are similar to the complainant in all respects but
for the protected characteristic—is barely functional in today’s economy and is
largely unresponsive to updated understandings of discrimination”); id. at 733
(noting that under the comparative method, “however abusively an employer
treats its employees, the bad acts do not present a discrimination problem so long
as they are committed in an evenhanded fashion.”); id. at 751 (noting that “[a]s a
practical matter, comparators are hard to find even in workplaces with a diverse
group of employees,” and that “conceptually, the existence of a comparator is
simply not relevant, under some discrimination theories, to the question whether
discrimination has occurred”).
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Court of Appeals decision, Franchina v. City of Providence,329
applying the sex-plus doctrine to a Title VII claim (albeit one
involving allegations of a sexually hostile work environment
based in part on evidence of pure gender discrimination).330
In Franchina, a former female firefighter of the
Providence, Rhode Island, fire department, Lori Franchina,
sued the city, its fire department, and union asserting a Title
VII claim for hostile work environment based on her gender,
as well as a retaliation claim for having reported the
harassment to her superiors.331 After trial, a jury ruled in
Franchina’s favor on each of her claims, and awarded her
front pay and emotional damages.332
In its attempt to overturn the jury’s verdict on the sexual
harassment charge,333 the City argued on appeal that
Franchina failed to present sufficient evidence under a sexplus theory of discrimination as required by the First
Circuit’s Title VII jurisprudence.334 Specifically, the City
argued that for a plaintiff like Franchina to be successful
under a sex-plus theory, the plaintiff must “identify a
corresponding sub-class of the opposite gender and show that
the corresponding class was not subject to similar
harassment or discrimination.”335 Thus, the City argued that
Franchina “is required to have presented evidence at trial of
a comparative class of gay male firefighters who were not
discriminated against” because, in the City’s view, without

329. See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2018)
(summarizing Franchina’s claims).
330. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Lori Franchina at 26, Franchina v. City of
Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (No. 16-2401).
331. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 37, 45–46.
332. Id. at 37–38.
333. See id. at 46 (“On appeal, the City shines its spotlight solely on the hostile
work environment cause of action.”).
334. Id. at 51.
335. Id. at 52.
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such evidence, “it would not be possible to prove that any sort
of differential treatment a plaintiff experiences is necessarily
predicated on his or her gender.”336
The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the City’s
argument for numerous reasons.337 First, the court declared
that the City’s argument, if accepted, “would permit
employers to discriminate free from Title VII recourse so long
as they do not employ any subclass member of the opposite
gender.”338 This result, according to the court, cannot be
correct, as it would “be inapposite to Title VII’s mandate
against sex-based discrimination.”339 In a related point, the
court declared that “discrimination against one employee
cannot be remedied solely by nondiscrimination against
another employee in that same group.”340 For this reason, the
court noted, “discrimination [that] adversely affects only a
portion of the protected class” remains unlawful.341
“Similarly,” the court declared, “the effect of Title VII is not
to be diluted because discrimination adversely affects a
plaintiff who is unlucky enough to lack a comparator in his

336. Id.
337. See id. at 52 (stating that the City’s argument “has some rather obvious
flaws”). But see Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colorado, Inc., 108 F.3d 1199,
1202–04 (10th Cir. 1997) (ruling in a sex-plus-marital status claim that a female
plaintiff must show that her male co-workers with the same marital status were
treated differently, and reversing jury verdict for plaintiff due to a lack of
evidence on that point).
338. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 52.
339. Id. at 53.
340. Id. (quoting Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 n.4 (1st Cir.
2009)); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–55 (stating that the
purpose of Title VII “is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the
protection of the minority group as a whole,” and explaining that in enacting Title
VII, “Congress never intended to give an employer license to discriminate against
some employees on the basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats
other members of the employees’ group”).
341. Franchina, 881 F.3d at 53 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
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or her workplace.”342
Finally, the court declared that the City’s proposed
comparator requirement “conflicts also with Title VII’s text
and jurisprudence.”343 The court explained:
Requiring a plaintiff to point to a comparator of the opposite gender
implies the inquiry is that of “but-for” causation. That is to say, the
City’s approach requires Franchina to make a showing that, all else
being equal (the “plus” factors being the same), the discrimination
would not have occurred but for her gender. Title VII requires no
such proof. The text bars discrimination when sex is “a motivating
factor,” not “the motivating factor.”344

Regarding this latter point, the court concluded by
noting that the label, sex-plus, “does not mean that more
than simple sex discrimination must be alleged.”345 Rather,
the court observed, “the sex-plus label is no more than a
heuristic . . . to affirm that plaintiffs can, under certain
circumstances, survive summary judgment [and obtain a
favorable verdict at trial] even when not all members of a
disfavored class are discriminated against.”346
As Franchina observed, the sex-plus theory of
discrimination is merely a tool for unveiling discrimination
against a particular subset of male or female employees
where an employer treats only that particular subset in a
sexually discriminatory manner.347 Moreover, it is well
established that an employer in a sex-plus case cannot justify
its discriminatory actions towards a particular subgroup of

342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
345. Id. (quoting Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 43).
346. Id. (quoting Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 43).
347. See also Myers v. Goodwill Indus. of Akron, Inc., 701 N.E.2d 738, 743
(Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating that “[t]he point behind the establishment of the
sex-plus discrimination theory is to allow Title VII plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment when the defendant employer does not discriminate against all
members of the sex” (emphasis in original)).
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women by pointing to its favorable treatment of other women
not in that subgroup.348 By the same token, an employer
defending a sexual orientation discrimination claim cannot
justify its discriminatory treatment of lesbians with evidence
of how it treats heterosexual women.349 In fact, the opposite
is true, as a female plaintiff alleging sexual orientation
discrimination can sometimes benefit by evidence that her
employer treats heterosexual females more favorably. Such
evidence, for example, might help a plaintiff like Hively
expose her employer’s specific animus against homosexual
females, rather than females on the whole, based on gender
stereotypes.350 For this reason, courts analyzing sex-plus
claims have found, for example, that a plaintiff’s age-plusgender claim alleging discrimination against older women
can be proven with evidence of differential treatment
between the plaintiff and younger women.351 After all, where
an employer treats both older women and younger women
with the same discriminatory intent, the plaintiff’s claim
would be better cast as a pure sex discrimination claim.
In the final analysis, sex discrimination claims require
proof that “the employer actually relied on [a plaintiff’s]
gender in making its decision.”352 What matters most, then,
is not whether the plaintiff can generate evidence pertaining
either to an opposite gender comparator or to other women

348. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543–44 (1971)
(finding that a policy of refusing to hire women with pre-school age children
discriminates on the basis of sex even though “75–80% of those hired for the
position” at issue were women).
349. See id.
350. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Lori Franchina at 30, Franchina v. City of
Providence, 881 F.3d 32 (No. 16-2401).
351. See, e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Johnson Cty., Kansas, 96 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1187–88 (D. Kan. 2000) (stating that because “[p]laintiff’s ageplus-gender claim is based on defendants’ alleged discrimination
against . . . older women . . . plaintiff must show differential treatment between
herself and younger women” to prevail).
352. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
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outside the plaintiff’s subclass, but rather whether the
plaintiff can show that her gender was “a motivating factor”
in the employer’s adverse decision, which is all Title VII
requires.353 For sexual orientation discrimination claims,
sex-plus theory provides the basis for such a claim.354
CONCLUSION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex, and well-established sexplus precedents make clear that such discrimination can
occur even when not all male or female employees in a
defendant’s workforce experience the same discriminatory
treatment. Although the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits
have taken the initiative in expanding Title VII’s protections
to claims of sexual orientation discrimination, the majority
of federal appellate courts still cling to the idea that sexual
orientation discrimination is not unlawful. As this Article
has shown, sex-plus theory destroys that notion, and can
serve a critical role in bringing uniformity to the nation’s
laws on this issue.

353. See Franchina, 881 F.3d at 53.
354. See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112–13 (2d Cir.
2018) (explaining why, in the Second Circuit’s view, “sexual orientation is a
function of sex”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Indiana, 853 F.3d 339, 346–47
(7th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “a policy that discriminates on the basis of sexual
orientation . . . is based on assumptions about the proper behavior for someone of
a given sex,” and that “[a]ny . . . job decision based on the fact that the
complainant—woman or man—dresses differently, speaks differently, or dates or
marries a same-sex partner, is a reaction purely and simply based on sex,” such
that “it falls within Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination”); Baldwin
v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *6 (July 15, 2015)
(explaining that sexual orientation discrimination is “sex” discrimination because
“an employee alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is alleging
that his or her employer took his or her sex into account by treating him or her
differently for associating with a person of the same sex”).

